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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
ROBERT KELTON BERRY, : Case No. 20040142-CA 
Defendant/Appellant, 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for aggravated robbery, a first 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated section 76-6-302 (2003). This Court 
i 
has jurisdiction over first degree felony appeals which the Supreme Court transfers to 
this Court. Utah Code Annotated section 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENTS 
1. Jury instructions defining reasonable doubt must specifically require the State 
to obviate all reasonable doubt and must avoid comparisons to major life decisions. The 
instructions below never explained the State's burden to obviate all reasonable doubt. 
During closing arguments, defense counsel compared reasonable doubt to deciding 
whether to marry or buy a house. Did defense counsel's comments or the jury 
instructions on the State's burden of proof cause structural error as a matter of law? 
Because the law is well-established on the requirements for reasonable doubt 
instructions, the trial judge plainly erred in failing to accurately instruct the jury. State v. 
Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, ^|19, 84 P.3d 841. In any event, defense counsel's misstatements 
on reasonable doubt and her failure to object to the instructions fell b elow an objective 
standard of reasonableness. State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). 
2. The Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and due process of law require trial 
judges to instruct the jury on the law at the close of the evidence. The trial judge gave 
the jury several preliminary instructions on, among other matters, the presumption of 
innocence, the State's burden of proof, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but he did 
not repeat those instructions at the close of the evidence. Did the trial judge plainly error 
in failing to instruct the jury at the close of the evidence? Likewise, was defense counsel 
ineffective for failing to object to the absence of closing instructions? The standards of 
review for these questions are the same as under Issue #1 .* 
3. Audience members at a jury trial may not signal answers or otherwise coach 
testifying witnesses. At Mr. Berry's trial, a juror informed the trial judge that he had 
seen an audience member signaling answers to the victim during the victim's testimony. 
]The first two issues are also raised in three appeals presently before the Utah 
Supreme Court. See State v. Reyes. No. 20030051-SC; State v. Cruz. No. 20020735-SC; 
State v. Weaver, No. 20030199-SC. The Supreme Court will schedule those three cases 
for oral argument once the parties complete an expedited briefing schedule in Reyes . 
The State has filed the opening brief in Reyes and counsel for Mr. Reyes will file a 
responding brief by September 20, 2004. The briefing in Cruz and Weaver is complete. 
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Did the trial judge erroneously forbid the jury from considering the coaching in 
determining the facts and the victim's credibility? 
Although trial judges generally have discretion in responding to audience 
coaching, Sharp v. Commonwealth. 849 S.W.2d 542, 547 (Ky. 1993), this Court reviews 
jury instructions for correctness. State v. Squire, 888 P.2d 1102, 1104 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994). Defense counsel objected to the instruction and requested the trial judge to 
interview all jurors on whether they had seen the coaching. R. 266: 136-48.2 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND COURT RULES 
Addendum E: Utah R. Crim. P. 17(g) 
Addendum F: Utah R. Crim. P. 19 
Addendum G: U.S. Const. Amend. VI 
Addendum H: Utah Const, art. I, §12 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In April of 2003, the State charged Appellant Robert Berry ("Robert") and his 
brother Karl Tracey Berry ("Karl") with one count each of aggravated robbery. R. 1-3. 
Following a preliminary hearing, the trial court bound over both brothers for trial. R. 
263: 37-38. On July 29, 2003, Robert requested the trial court to sever his case from 
Karl's because he claimed that Karl had committed the robbery on his own. R. 25. The 
2Volumes 266 and 267 contains the trial transcripts from Mr. Berry's second jury 
trial. Volume 265 contains the transcript of Mr. Berry's first trial. The preliminary 
transcript is included in volume 263 while volume 264 contains the transcript of a motion 
hearing. Finally, the sentencing hearing is included in volume 261. The internal page 
numbers of these volumes are included after "R." and the volume number. 
trial court agreed to sever the cases because of antagonistic defenses. R. 264: 31-33. 
Robert proceeded to a jury trial on October 27, 2003. R. 265. That proceeding 
resulted in a mistrial after a witness testified about inadmissible character evidence. IcL_ 
at 130-49. At a subsequent jury trial on December 9, 2003, the trial judge gave the jury 
preliminary instructions immediately after jury selection, read several other instructions 
on the law following opening statements, and then read the remainder of the instructions 
before closing arguments. R. 266: 76, 84; 267: 276. During trial, the judge also 
removed the victim's mother from the courtroom after a juror reported that the mother 
had been coaching the victim's testimony. R. 266: 138. The trial judge instructed the 
jury not to consider as evidence any audience gesturing and allowed defense counsel to 
cross-examine the victim about the coaching. IcL at 144-46. The jury later convicted 
Robert of aggravated robbery. Id. at 303, 305-06. 
The trial judge sentenced Robert on February 5, 2004, and ordered him to serve a 
term of six years to life. R. 261: 31; Addendum A. The trial judge also allowed the State 
up to 60 days to file a motion for restitution. Id. Robert filed a timely notice of appeal 
on February 17, 2004. R. 231. The State then filed a restitution motion on April 7, 
2004. R. 255. That motion remains pending in the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The relevant facts unfolded on March 12, 2003, at 8:34 p.m. when West Valley 
City Police Officer Robert Cowan stopped a white Hyundai that was traveling eastbound 
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on route U-201 (2100 South Freeway) near 5000 West. R. 265: 121-23. Robert was 
driving the vehicle and his brother Karl was traveling in the passenger seat. R. 267: 233-
34. Robert fully cooperated with the officer, including providing his correct name and a 
rental car agreement for the Hyundai that also listed his name. Id. at 237-38. 
During the stop, Officer Cowan noticed that the car's back seat was folded down 
and had a car bumper lying on top. Id. at 234. Robert explained that the bumper 
belonged to his car which had recently been stolen. Id. at 238. Officer Cowan also 
detected a strong gasoline smell from inside the car. Id. at 234. After Officer Cowan 
cited Robert for a traffic violation, Robert drove away. Id_ at 239. 
Shortly thereafter, 19-year old Phillip Brandan Booth ("Brandan") was walking 
southbound on 900 West at approximately 2600 South. IcL at 85-86; 267: 220. Brandan 
had been at his father's camper/trailer located north of 2100 South. R. 266: 85. Brandan 
had to walk to 3300 South to catch a bus to travel to his mother's home in Magna 
because the bus that traverses 900 West had stopped running for the day. I<1_ at 85-86. 
Near a business named Superior Insulation, Robert and Karl pulled along side 
Brandan. IcL at 87; R. 267: 210, 221. Karl spoke from the passenger seat and offered 
Brandan a ride. R. 266: 88. Brandan accepted and sat down on the folded back seat next 
to the spare bumper. Id. at 88-89. Robert informed Brandan of his correct name, but 
Karl provided a false one. IcL at 92, 119. Although Brandan informed the police that he 
thought he recognized Robert as an acquaintance from Magna, he realized after getting 
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inside the car that he did not know either of the brothers. IcL at 88, 117. 
As Robert drove toward 3300 South, he indicated that Karl needed to stop briefly 
at the Valley Fair Mall to return some pants. R. 265: 25; 266: 89-90. Robert drove to the 
mall and parked near JC Penney's, while Karl went inside the mall. IcL at 91. While 
waiting for Karl to return, Robert and Brandan briefly conversed in the car. IcL at 120-
21; 265: 58-59. During this period Robert blurted out that he was "sick" of being Karl's 
"chauffeur" and that he felt like Karl's "T'ing taxi." R. 263: 21; 265: 26; 266: 91. 
Despite this outburst, Brandan agreed that Robert acted pleasantly toward him. LdL at 107. 
After Karl returned to the car, the three men noticed that the bus to Magna had left 
the mall. IdL at 92-93. Accordingly, Robert and Karl offered to drive Brandan to Magna. 
Id. Robert then proceeded to a nearby McDonald's restaurant and ordered some food at 
the drive-up window. IdL at 93, 120. Although Brandan declined to buy any food for 
himself, Karl bought Brandan an ice cream cone. Id. 
From the restaurant, Robert drove northwest toward an industrial area that lies 
between 3600 West and the Bangerter Highway. Id. The highway runs north and south 
along approximately 3800 West and intersects with U-201 at about 2100 South. IcL; R. 
267: 180-84, 223. Route U-201 leads west to Magna. R. 267: 223. A residential area is 
located on the east side of 3600 South. R. 267: 180-81. 
Brandan mostly remained silent in the back seat while he observed the brothers 
speaking with each other but he could not hear the content of their conversations. IdL; R-
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265: 21. At one point, Brandan did ask where they were traveling and Karl responded 
that he needed to go to a friend's house. R. 265: 28. Near 2400 South, Karl exclaimed, 
"Stop, stop, I need to get out." Id. at 93; R. 267: 225. Robert parked the car in the 
industrial area as Karl exited the car and vomited. R. 266: 93-95. Karl re-entered the car 
and then Robert resumed driving. Id. at 94. 
A few minutes later, Robert suggested that he lift up the back seat so Brandan 
could sit more comfortably. Id at 94-96. Accordingly, Robert parked the car behind a 
warehouse next to a loading dock and Brandan exited the vehicle. IcL_ at 94-95. As 
Robert adjusted the back seat, Karl approached Brandan from behind and punched him 
in the head. IcL at 96-97. Brandan gathered himself and turned around to fight back but 
stopped when he saw Karl holding a knife and demanding Brandan's possessions. IcL_ at 
97-98. Brandan handed Karl his cd player, wallet, and toiletry bag which contained an 
electric shaver. Id at 99. Karl removed $15 from the wallet and returned it to Brandan. 
Id. Brandan informed the police without specifying anyone that "the suspects took the 
CD's" and that the CD holder contained "about 130" CDs. R. 267: 226-27. 
At some point, Brandan heard Karl yell, "Go get the gun." R. 266: 101. Brandan 
saw Robert out of the comer of his eye reaching for something under the front car seat. 
Id. Karl then ordered Brandan to move toward the building, kneel in the comer, and face 
the wall. IdL at 101-02; 267: 226. Brandan heard one of the brothers threatened to kill 
him if he turned around but he could not see who made the threat. R. 266: 103, 113. 
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Brandan then felt cold steel on the back of his head which he "assumed" was a gun. IcL_ 
at 103-04, 130. But, Brandan conceded that he never actually saw a gun and that he did 
not know who had placed the cold steel to the back of his head. Id_ at 129-30. 
As Brandan stood in the corner, Karl ordered him to remove his sweat shirt, but 
Robert stopped him and told Karl that they had to go. Id. at 132, 150-52. The two 
brothers then re-entered the car and drove away. IcL at 150. As they were leaving, one of 
the brothers threw a dollar to Brandan so he could pay for the bus ride home. IcL at 106. 
Brandan then walked to a warehouse and approached a security guard who summoned 
the police. R. 266: 105-06; 267: 168-71. The guard reported that Brandan was bleeding, 
crying, hyperventilating, and could barley talk. Id at 169, 190; R. 266: 105-06. 
A few days later, Robert spoke by telephone to a police detective to clarify his 
presence at the crime scene. IcL at 247-48. The detective read Robert the Miranda 
warnings which Robert willingly waived. Id_ at 248, 263. Robert denied participating in 
Karl's criminal activities and blamed Karl for the robbery. Id. at 252. He informed the 
officer that the bumper on top of the back seat belonged to his car which Robert believed 
Karl had stolen. Id. at 266. Apparently, Karl and Robert were together that evening in 
search of the stolen vehicle. As he and Karl searched, Robert saw Brandan hitch-hiking 
so he stopped to offer Brandan a ride. Id. Brandan accepted because Robert and Karl 
were going to Magna as well. Id. 
During the encounter, Karl sent Robert a text message through his cellular 
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telephone in which he told Robert to "pull over just right at the next light" so Karl could 
"jack" Brandan. IcL at 259-63. Robert understood the term "jack" to mean rob. Id. 
Robert refused to assist Karl and informed him, "No, Karl, it is not worth it." IcL at 264. 
This conversation apparently took place after Karl had returned the pants at the mall 
because Robert wanted to warn Brandan of Karl's plans but he dared not do so with Karl 
in the car and Brandan sitting in the back seat. IcL at 256-58, 262. 
Although Robert admitted stopping the car to allow Karl to vomit and stopping 
again to adjust the back seat, he stated that he was "totally against" robbing Brandan. IcL 
at 262. When Karl hit Brandan, Robert ordered Karl to "knock it off and leave him 
alone." Id at 265. Robert denied taking Brandan's CDs and explained that Karl had 
stolen them together with the other items. IcL at 265-66. Robert asserted that he asked 
Karl to return the stolen items to Brandan, including the wallet and a dollar so Brandan 
would have money to take the bus home. IcL at 256, 265. And, just as Brandan stated, 
Robert explained that he stopped Brandan from removing his sweat shirt. IcL at 266. 
Robert volunteered to the detective that Karl had a knife but he denied ever using 
the weapon. IcL at 267. As for the alleged gun, Robert claimed that no gun used at all, 
but, rather, Karl mentioned a gun and threatened to shoot Brandan to frighten and deter 
Brandan from calling the police. IcL at 254, 265. Robert adamantly denied putting 
anything to the back of Brandan's head or threatening to harm him. IcL at 254. Instead, 
Robert admitted that he told Brandan to remain facing the building because he didn't 
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want him to be able to identify the car license plate. Id. at 253. 
After speaking with Robert, the police charged him and Karl with aggravated 
robbery. R. 1-3. Upon learning of the charges, Robert voluntarily turned himself over to 
pretrial services. R. 263: 40. The trial court conducted a preliminary hearing at which 
Brandan repeated his general claims but, in doing so, alleged that the encounter began 
"around dusk, about 6:00" contrary to Officer Cowan's undisputed report that he ticketed 
Robert after 8:30 p.m. Id at 6. Brandan also testified that he thought he recognized 
Robert from attending Woods Cross High School as opposed to his statement to police 
that he knew Robert from Magna. Id. at 18. He indicated further that he may have lost 
as many as 250 CDs rather than the 130 that he reported to police. IdL. at 23. Similarly, 
Brandan alleged that when Karl first brandished the knife, Karl pointed the knife at 
Karl's own chest rather than at Brandan's. Id. at 9. 
Brandan gave additional conflicting testimony about who stole the CDs. Initially, 
he testified that he gave Karl "my CD player, my CD's, everything I had on me, my 
wallet." Id at 9; Addendum B. When the prosecutor asked Brandan what Robert 
specifically did during the incident, he stated that he was not sure because he focused on 
Karl and so he "wasn't concentrating on the driver" Id. When the prosecutor asked 
Brandan again if he could remember Robert's actions, Brandan replied, "No." Id_ The 
prosecutor pressed Brandan further on who took "any of your specific property? Did the 
passenger take it all, did the driver participate at all?" Id_ Brandan then alleged for the 
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first time, "The driver took my CD's, and the passenger took the rest." Id. 
On cross-examination, Brandan again claimed that "the passenger" had taken the 
CDs. Id at 14-15. After Brandan immediately reversed himself and claimed that "the 
driver" took the CDs, defense counsel asked him if he was "sure." Brandan responded 
non-responsively, "I am not sure. I am not sure if they were in the car or not." Id. at 15. 
Then, on redirect examination, Brandan claimed for the first time that the driver took the 
CDs and stated, "I am keeping these." Id. at 25. The trial court found sufficient evidence 
that Robert was a party to the crime and bound him over for trial. Id. at 37-38. 
At a jury trial, although Brandan maintained that the crime occurred at "dusk," he 
changed his testimony about the time of the incident from 6:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. R. 265: 
46. Similarly, instead of claiming to know Robert from Magna or Woods Cross High 
School, Brandan testified that he thought he recognized Robert from "job corps." Id_ at 
23. When pressed on cross-examination about his recollection of the events, Brandan 
conceded that his memory of events was suspect because he was "terrified" following the 
robbery and he was "really nervous" at the preliminary hearing. IdL at 67, 74. Brandan 
also contradicted his prior statements and asserted that Karl pointed the knife at 
Brandan's chest and neck rather than Karl pointing it at his own chest. Id_ at 32-36, 62. 
Brandan also added several new details and further contradicted his earlier 
statements about the taking of the CDs. For the first time, he claimed that Robert made a 
U-turn when the brothers asked Brandan for a ride. R. 265: 22, 70. Brandan claimed 
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further that the CD case held 200 CDs and that it was "full." Id_ at 21. On cross-
examination, Brandan denied informing the police that the case contained only 130 CDs. 
Id. at 52-53. Moreover, Brandan testified, for the first time, that before Robert took the 
CDs, Karl ordered Robert to f'[g]ive him [Brandan] back his CDs," to which Robert 
replied that he was keeping them. Id. at 38, 68-69. The trial eventually resulted in a 
mistrial when a police officer repeatedly offered inadmissible testimony. Id. at 146-47. 
The trial court conducted a second jury trial a few weeks later. R. 266-67. After 
selecting the jury but before the attorneys' opening statements, the trial judge gave the 
jurors preliminary instructions one through ten. R. 175-184; Addendum C. Those 
instructions informed the jurors of their duties, explained the roles of the various actors 
in the trial, and outlined the proceedings, the presumption of innocence, and the types of 
evidence that may be presented. Following the attorneys' opening statements, the trial 
judge read to the jury instructions 11 to 17 which addressed assessing the credibility of 
evidence and witnesses, the burden of proof, the presumption of innocence, and 
definitions of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. R. 184-86; Addendum B. 
During Brandan's testimony, he again testified that he gave Karl his "CD's, my 
radio, my wallet, everything I had." R. 266: 99; Addendum D. Brandan then corrected 
himself and claimed that Robert had taken the CDs and, again, non-responsively added, 
"And then I don't remember where my CD's were. I think they were in the car." Id. 
When asked what Robert was doing while Karl held the knife to his throat, Brandan 
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testified, "I think he was reaching under the seat. I am not sure. It was a long time ago, 
and I don't remember every little thing." Id. 
When asked about who took the CDs, stated, "I don't remember where they were 
or anything, but the - his brother [Karl] wanted to give them back to me, and then he 
[Robert] looked through them." Id^ at 100. According to Brandan, Robert responded, "I 
am keeping these." Id Brandan asserted that the CD holder contained 200 CDs. IdL. On 
redirect examination, Brandan reiterated that Robert took the CDs. Id. at 148. He also 
added that Robert appeared "aggressive" during the encounter. Id_ at 149, 152. 
The police officer who took Brandan's statement at the scene confirmed that 
Brandan stated that he had lost only 130 CDs and that never specified who took the CDs. 
R. 267: 226. Likewise, Brandan never disclosed Robert making a U-turn, thumbing 
through the CDs, or stating that he was keeping the CDs. IcL_ at 221-22, 227. Brandan 
also failed to mention Karl ordering Robert to return the CDs to Brandan . Id at 222. 
During Brandan's cross-examination, a juror interrupted the proceedings and 
indicated that he needed to report something to the court. R. 266: 136. The trial judge 
took a short break and asked the juror to write his concerns on paper and have the bailiff 
deliver the note to the judge. IdL The juror reported that, "The lady in the audience is 
prompting the witness [Brandan] with head shakes the last ten minutes." Id. at 137. 
The trial judge cleared the courtroom except for the parties. Id. at 136-37. After 
questioning Brandan's mother and the victim coordinator, the judge concluded that 
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Brandan's mother may have signaled answers to Brandan. Id_ at 137. Accordingly, the 
judge removed her from the courtroom for the remainder of the trial. Id_ 
To remedy the mother's misconduct, defense counsel argued that the trial judge 
should: (1) ask all the jurors if they had seen any coaching; (2) interview individual 
jurors; and, (3) instruct the jurors accordingly. Id. at 140. The trial judge agreed to 
instruct all of the jurors but declined to question jurors to avoid "further emphasizing] 
the process . . . especially when I believe that the issue can be cured with an instruction." 
Id at 141. The judge proposed instructing the jurors to rely only on admitted evidence 
and to disregard gestures, facial expressions, or other demonstrations by non-witnesses. 
Id at 144. He further proposed allowing defense counsel to cross-examine Brandan 
about whether his mother's coaching had affected his testimony. IcL at 142. 
Defense counsel objected to the proposed instruction because she believed that 
"this juror should be able to consider . . . what he saw as prompting." IcL Counsel 
complained that the instruction would inform "the juror to disregard what he saw, and he 
can't give any weight to what [the mother] was saying." Id^ at 142. Because of her 
suspicion that Brandan would simply deny that his mother's coaching had affected his 
testimony, defense counsel argued that cross-examination would be ineffective. Id. 
The trial judge disagreed and ruled that cross-examination would cure any 
possibility that the coaching had affected Brandan or the jury. Id. at 144. The trial judge 
instructed the jurors not to consider any gestures or signaling in deciding the evidence: 
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We are going to proceed now with cross examination 
. . . Let me give you an instruction in between here. . . . Jurors 
are to accept as evidence or rely on in their deliberations only 
testimony and other evidence presented and accepted in court. 
They may not consider gestures, facial expressions, or any other 
demonstration by any other person in the courtroom. 
Id at 145-46. 
Following the close of the evidence, the trial judge gave the jurors the remaining 
instructions, beginning with instruction 18. R. 267: 276. These instructions addressed 
the jurors' deliberations, reaching a verdict, resolving disagreements, and the elements of 
the crimes of aggravated robbery and robbery. Id, at 186-205. 
During closing arguments, defense counsel argued that the evidence left a 
reasonable doubt that Robert intentionally participated in Karl's criminal acts. Id. at 282-
95. In explaining reasonable doubt, defense counsel likened the seriousness of the 
jurors' duties to deciding whether to marry or to buy a house: 
And I have talked about how serious these offenses are, 
and how important, if not more important, than deciding who 
you are going to marry or if you are going to buy a house. 
That's how careful you have to be and what factors you would 
weigh in saying, "Am I going to marry this person?" And the 
thing is, in a case like that, with buying a house or marrying 
someone, you can change that decision. You can get a divorce. 
You can sell your house. But in this case you cannot. 
R. 267: 294; Addendum E. In excusing the jury to deliberate, the trial judge gave each 
of the jurors written copies of the instructions. Id_ at 301. 
The jury returned a guilty verdict on aggravated robbery. Id^ at 303-04. The trial 
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judge subsequently sentenced Robert to serve a term of six years to life. R. 261: 31. 
Rather than addressing restitution at sentencing, the trial judge allowed the State up to 60 
days to file for restitution because of the "problems" presented in the case concerning the 
amount owed. Id. This appeal followed. R. 231. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Reversal is required as a matter of law because the jury instructions defining 
reasonable doubt lessened the State's burden of proof. Specifically, the instructions 
failed to require the State to obviate all reasonable doubt. The trial court plainly erred 
and defense counsel was ineffective in approving the instructions. This Court recently 
ruled in State v. Reyes. 2004 UT App 8, 84 P.3d 841, that failing to require the state to 
obviate all reasonable doubt constitutes structural error and requires automatic reversal. 
Defense counsel compounded this error when she likened reasonable doubt to 
deciding whether to marry or to buy a home. Utah law specifically forbids comparing 
reasonable doubt to important life decisions because such decisions, unlike a jury verdict, 
are revokable and inject considerable doubt into jurors' minds. Defense counsel not only 
erred in making this comparison but she was ineffective because she added to the jurors' 
misunderstanding of reasonable doubt. 
Even if the reasonable doubt instructions had satisfied due process requirements, 
the trial judge plainly erred in failing to instruct the jury at the close of the evidence. 
This Court also ruled in Reyes that the plain language of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
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Procedure require trial judges to instruct the jury on the applicable law at the close of the 
evidence. Likewise, due process of law demands that trial judges re-instruct the jury, 
particularly on the presumption of innocence, the state's burden of proof, and proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Because the failure to re-instruct the jury on these essential 
rights precluded the jury from understanding the State's constitutional burden of proof, 
this Court should presume prejudice, just as with the erroneous reasonable doubt 
instructions. In any event, the State cannot show beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial 
judge's failure to instruct the jury on the law at the close of the case did not affect the 
jury's verdict, especially given Brandan's unfounded assumptions that Robert was a 
willing participant and his poor memory and numerous inconsistencies. 
The trial judge further erred in instructing the jury that they could not consider 
Brandan's mother's coaching in reaching a verdict. The jury has the sole duty to 
determine the witnesses' credibility. Cross-examination did not remedy the erroneous 
jury instruction because accepting Brandan's denial is ineffective in curing potential 
juror bias. The trial judge further erred in refusing to hold a hearing to determine 
whether the coaching had biased other jurors. When any doubt arises about a juror's 
partiality, the trial judge has a duty to interview each juror about the jurors' fitness to 
fairly decide the defendant's guilt or innocence. Because the coaching directly addressed 
Brandan's credibility and Brandan provided the only evidence of guilt, the failure to 
interview jurors for bias and the faulty jury instruction prejudiced the defense. 
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ARGUMENT 
Numerous errors of constitutional proportion deprived Robert of a fair 
determination of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. First, the trial judge and defense 
counsel failed to correctly explain the State's burden of obviating all reasonable doubt. 
Second, the trial judge plainly erred in failing to instruct the jury at the close of the 
evidence, especially on the presumption of innocence, the State's burden of proof, and 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Third, in forbidding the jury from considering 
Brandan's mother's coaching and not interviewing the jurors, the trial judge invaded the 
jury's sole province to determine credibility and he breached his duty to secure an 
impartial jury. These errors require reversal and a new trial either because they constitute 
structural error or the State cannot show harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt. 
I. THE INCORRECT JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND 
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S ARGUMENTS ON 
REASONABLE DOUBT REQUIRE REVERSAL AS A 
MATTER OF LAW 
Constitutional principles require this Court to reverse this case as a matter of law 
because the jury instructions and defense counsel's comments on reasonable doubt 
lessened the State's burden of proof. In Utah, trial judges must instruct the jury on the 
State's burden to obviate all reasonable doubt. Utah law also forbids comparing 
reasonable doubt to important life decisions because such matters often include 
considerable doubts. The jury instructions here failed to explain the State's burden to 
obviate reasonable doubt. Defense counsel compounded this error when she likened 
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reasonable doubt to deciding whether to marry or to buy a home. Reversal is required 
because structural error resulted and, in any event, the State cannot meet its burden of 
showing harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt. 
A. The Jury Instructions on Reasonable Doubt 
Vio la ted Minimal Const i tut iona l 
Requirements. 
The trial judge plainly erred in failing to require the State to obviate all reasonable 
doubt. In State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1232 (Utah 1997), the Utah Supreme Court 
adopted Justice Stewart's dissent in State v. Ireland. 773 P.2d 1375, 1381 (Utah 1989), 
and established three essential requirements for reasonable doubt instructions in Utah: 
First, "the instruction should specifically state that the State's 
proof must obviate all reasonable doubt." [State v. ] Ireland, 
773 P.2d [1375,] 1381 [(Utah 1989)] (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
Second, the instruction should not state that a reasonable doubt 
is one which "would govern or control a person in the more 
weighty affairs of life," as such an instruction tends to trivialize 
the decision of whether to convict. Id (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
Third, "it is inappropriate to instruct that a reasonable doubt is 
not merely a possibility," although it is permissible to instruct 
that a "fanciful or wholly speculative possibility ought not to 
defeat proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Id at 1382 (Stewart, 
J., dissenting). 
Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1232 (Utah 1997\ overruled on unrelated grounds in State v. 
Weeks, 2002 UT 98, f25 n.l 1, 61 P.3d 1000. A violation of any these three 
requirements unconstitutionally "allows the jury to convict on something less than 
evidence proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Johnson. 774 P.2d 1141, 
1148 (Utah 1989) (Stewart, J., writing for majority). 
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This Court recently applied Robertson in State v. Reves. 2004 UT App 8, T|19, 84 
P.3d 841, and declared unconstitutional a reasonable doubt instruction that merely stated 
that "'[t]he burden is upon the prosecution to prove the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt.'" Id. at^jll (quoting the jury instruction). This Court rejected the 
instruction because "it failed to mention that the State's burden of proof 'must obviate all 
reasonable doubt.'" Id at {^19 (quoting Robertson. 932 P.2d at 1232).3 
The instructions below similarly failed to define the Stale's burden of proof: 
14. WHO IS RESPONSIBLE TO CONVINCE THE JURY? 
The prosecution has the burden of proof. It is the one 
making the accusations in this case. The defendant is not 
required to prove innocence - you must start by assuming it. 
According to our law, the defendant is presumed to be innocent 
unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This is an 
important and humane provision of the law intended to guard 
against the danger of an innocent person being unjustly 
punished. 
15. HOW CONVINCED MUST THE JURY BE BEFORE 
DECIDING THE DEFENDANT IS GUILTY? 
Before you can give up your assumption the defendant 
is innocent, you must be convinced that the defendant's guilt 
has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is that degree of proof which satisfies the 
mind and convinces the understanding of reasonable persons 
who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. 
3As stated in note 1, the Utah Supreme Court has granted certiorari review in 
Reyes. In Reyes, although this Court expressed concern that Robertson was not 
constitutionally sound, it applied Robertson's three-part test and ruled that only the Utah 
Supreme Court could overrule Robertson. Reves. 2004 UT 8,ffl[19-21, 84 P.3d 841. 
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16. WHAT IS REASONABLE DOUBT? 
A reasonable doubt is one based upon reason and 
common sense rather than speculation, supposition, emotion or 
sympathy. It is the kind of doubt that would make a reasonable 
person hesitate to act. It must be real and not merely imaginary. 
It is such as would be retained by reasonable men and women 
after a full and impartial consideration of all the evidence, and 
must arise from the evidence or lack of evidence in the case. 
17. HOW TO EVALUATE DOUBT 
If after such full and impartial consideration some 
possible doubt exists, you must determine whether such doubt 
is reasonable in light of all the evidence. Ask yourselves if the 
doubt is consistent with reason and common sense. The law 
does not require that the evidence dispel all possible or 
conceivable doubt, but rather the law requires that the evidence 
dispel all reasonable doubt. That is what is meant by the phrase 
"proof beyond a reasonable doubt." 
R. 185-86; Addendum C. 
None of these instructions affirmatively "state that the State's proof must obviate 
all reasonable doubt.'" Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1381 (Stewart, J., dissenting)). The closest 
these instructions come to satisfying this requirement is the statement in Instruction 14 
that "[t]he prosecution has the burden of proof." R. 58. Similarly, instruction 9 provides 
"it is the prosecution's burden to prove to you that the defendant is guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt." R. 182. But, as this Court ruled in Reyes, reasonable doubt 
instructions must not only identify that the State has the burden of proof, they must also 
"mention that the State's burden of proof 'must obviate all reasonable doubt.'" Reyes, 
2004 UT App 8, at ^ [19, 84 P.3d 841 (quoting Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1232). 
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The remaining instructions shed no light on the State's burden. Instruction 17, for 
example, reads "[t]he law does not require that the evidence dispel all possible or 
conceivable doubt, but rather the law requires that the evidence dispel all reasonable 
doubt." R. 186. Instruction 29 states that "the evidence must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt the conduct charged in the information and that the defendant committed such 
conduct with the culpable mental state required for such conduct." R. 192. Then, in 
defining the elements of aggravated robbery and robbery, the instructions inform the 
jurors to convict if, "after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are 
convinced of the truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt . . . . " R. 200, 202. 
None of these instructions affirmatively required the State to obviate all 
reasonable doubt. Rather, they passively focus on "the evidence11 proving guilt rather 
than burdening the State to obviate all reasonable doubt. The key concept that the jury 
must understand under Robertson is that the State has the affirmative duty to prove guilt. 
932 P.2d at 1232. In failing to convey this essential concept, the instructions " allowed 
the jury to convict on something less than evidence proving guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt." Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1148 (Stewart, J., writing for majority). 
Although defense counsel failed to object to the reasonable doubt instructions, 
this Court reviews jury instructions to ensure that "a manifest injustice" does not result. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 19(e). A manifest injustice occurs when the trial judge plainly errs. 
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State v. Geukgeuzian, 2002 UT App 130, f5, 54 P.3d 640. A trial court plainly errs 
when: "(0 a n e r r o r w a s made; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; 
and, (iii) the error was harmful, so that in the absence of the error, a more favorable 
outcome was reasonably likely." State v. HelmicL 2000 UT 70, Tf9, 9 P.3d 164. 
This Court ruled in Reyes that Robertson plainly requires trial judges to 
specifically instruct the jury that the State must "obviate" all reasonable doubt. Reyes, 
2004 UT App 8,1fl 9, 84 P.3d 841. This error was obvious because Robertson "clear[ly] 
required judges to inform jurors that the State must "obviate" all reasonable doubt. Id.; 
State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, ffl[6, 16-18, 18 P.3d 1123. M oreover, under Reyes, 
prejudice is presumed as a matter of law when faulty instructions prevent the jury from 
finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 2004 UT App 8,1J16, 84 P.3d 841. "A 
constitutional defect in a jury instruction defining reasonable doubt requires automatic 
reversal of a conviction." State v. Peterson, 673 N.W.2d 482, 487 (Minn. 2004). 
Reversal is required because an "instructional error [which] consists of a misdescription 
of the burden of proof, [] vitiates all the jury's findings.5" Id. (quoting Sullivan v. 
Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281 (1993) (emphasis in original)). Thus, this misdescription, 
by definition, means that "a guilty verdict [] was never in fact rendered. . . ." Sullivan, 
508 U.S. at 279. Because the trial judge's omissions amount to structural error, reversal 
is required as a matter of law. Neder v. United States. 527 U.S. L 8 0999). 
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B. Defense Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing 
to Object to the Misleading Reasonable Doubt 
Instructions and for Compounding the 
Erroneous Instructions By Comparing 
Reasonable Doubt to Major Life Decisions. 
Independent of the trial judge's errors, defense counsel provided deficient 
representation because of her own failures to ensure that the jury was correctly informed 
of reasonable doubt. Defense counsel failed to object to the instructions and even 
approved of them. She then compounded her failure to object during closing arguments 
when she erroneously compared reasonable doubt to major life decisions. Because 
defense counsel's actions misinformed the jury of reasonable doubt, the jury did not enter 
a valid verdict and structural error resulted. 
When criminal defendants claim that counsel was ineffective on direct appeal, 
they must be represented by new counsel and they f,bear[] the burden of assuring the 
record is adequate" State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, Tfl6, 12 P.3d 92. Defense counsel 
is ineffective when counsel acts below an objective standard of reasonableness and the 
deficient performance prejudices the defendant. State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 
(Utah 1990). Prejudice requires criminal defendants to show '"that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome."1 Id at 187 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). 
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Defense counsel provided deficient assistance because she failed to object to the 
instructions defining reasonable doubt. Because the instructions failed to define the 
State's burden to obviate all reasonable doubt, they directly violated Robertson and 
required automatic reversal. Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, ffl|19, 21, 84 P.3d 841. M[N]o 
conceivable strategic reason" supports counsel's failure to object and thereby allowing 
the jury to convict Robert on less than a reasonable doubt. State v. Beltran-Felix, 922 
P.2d 30, 37 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Even if counsel's conduct was "conscious,11 her 
ineffectiveness deprived Robert of his basic constitutional trial rights and are, therefore, 
properly raised on appeal. State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 1989); State v. 
Bdgard, 811 P.2d 211, 214 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
In addition to failing to object, defense counsel violated Robertson 's prohibition 
against describing "a reasonable doubt [a]s one which 'would govern or control a person 
in the more weighty affairs of life '" 932 P.2d at 1232 (quoting Ireland, 773 P.2d at 
1381 (Stewart, J., dissenting)). During closing arguments, defense counsel compared 
reasonable doubt to "deciding who you are going to marry or if you are going to buy a 
house." R. 267: 294; Addendum E. Contrary to these analogies, "[n]othing that one 
does in the course of a normal life span is comparable to the decision to deprive another 
of either his life or liberty by voting to convict for a crime." Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1381 
(Stewart, J., dissenting). Rather, "[profound differences exist between decisions to 
convict another person and decisions to enter into marriage, buy a home, invest money, 
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have a child, or have a medical operation-or whatever else might be deemed a weighty 
affair of life." Id, 
Specifically, important life decisions that affect future conduct, inherently involve 
a degree of risk, hope, and determination, and are usually "revokable" or "at least 
salvageable." Id. In contrast, a decision to convict looks backward, involves no personal 
risk, hope or determination, and "is always irrevocable as to jurors." IcL Comparing a 
reasonable doubt to the doubts encountered when making major life decisions "tend[s] to 
diminish and trivialize the constitutionally required burden-of-proof standard." Id. 
Defense counsel's closing arguments violated these principles. By comparing 
reasonable doubt to marrying or buying a house, defense counsel endorsed the jurors' 
entertaining significant doubts in convicting Robert. Counsel's analogies lessened the 
State's burden of proof "because these decisions involve elements of uncertainty and 
risk-taking and are wholly unlike the kinds of decisions that jurors must make in criminal 
trials." Holmes v. State. 972 P.2d 337, 343 (Nev. 1998). 
Although defense counsel attempted to use decisions to marry and to buy a car to 
show "how careful" the jurors must be in deciding whether to convict, her efforts still 
"tend[ed] to diminish and trivialize the constitutionally required burden-of-proof 
standard." Ireland. 773 P.2d at 1381 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Counsel did indicate that 
deciding a person's guilt may be "more important" than major life decisions because 
unlike those decisions, jurors cannot "change" their decision to convict. R. 267: 294. 
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Nevertheless, defense counsel failed to explain that important life decisions are 
"[p]rofound[ly] different]" from juror service. Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1381 (Stewart, J., 
dissenting). To the contrary, defense counsel communicated to jurors that a reasonable 
doubt, like major life decisions, involve "uncertainty and risk-taking." Holmes, 972 P.2d 
at 343. In doing so, defense counsel lessened the State's burden of proof. Ireland , 773 
P.2d at 1381 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
Defense counsel's failure to object to the reasonable doubt instructions and her 
comparisons to major life decisions establish a " 'reasonable probability . . . sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome'" of the trial. Templin. 805 P.2d at 187 (quoting 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 66S, 694 (1984)). The failure to adequately explain 
reasonable doubt to the jury means, by definition, that "a guilty verdict [] was never in 
fact rendered. . . ." Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279. Because both the jury instructions and 
defense counsel comments lessened the State's burden of proof, the jury did not enter a 
valid verdict. Id; Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, TJ21, 84 P.3d 841. Thus, defense counsel's 
failure to object and her misleading arguments prejudiced Robert's rights a fair trial, a 
jury trial, and the effective assistance of counsel. Sullivan. 508 U.S. at 279. 
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II. THE TRIAL JUDGE VIOLATED PLAIN UTAH LAW 
AND MINIMAL DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS IN 
FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE LAW AT 
THE CLOSE OF THE EVIDENCE. 
Even if the trial judge adequately instructed the jury on reasonable doubt, he 
violated his duty to instruct the jury on the applicable law at the close of the evidence. 
Utah law and due process principles require judges to instruct jurors after the completion 
of the evidence. The trial judge's failure to repeat the instructions, especially on the 
presumption of innocence, the State's burden of proof, and proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, violated minimal due process standards. Like the problems with the reasonable 
doubt instructions, the trial judge's failure to repeat these instructions and defense 
counsel's failure to object to them resulted in an invalid verdict and requires reversal as a 
matter of law. Even if structural error did not occur, Brandan's assumption, 
contradictions, and memory problems prevent the State from showing harmlessness 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
A. The Trial Judge Erred in Failing to Instruct 
the Jury at the Close of the Evidence. 
The trial judge violated his duty to instruct the jury on the applicable law when he 
failed to read all of the instructions at the close of the evidence. In Reyes, this Court 
ruled that the "plain language of [Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(g)(6)] indicates 
that a trial court must instruct the jury at the close of the evidence." 2004 UT App 8, 
TJ24, 84 P.3d 841. That rule mandates that n[w]hen the evidence is concluded and at any 
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other appropriate time, the court shall instruct the jury." Utah R. Crim. P. 17(g)(6). 
Although trial judges have discretion to give the jury preliminary instructions and to 
instruct the jury throughout a trial, this Court ruled that this discretion does not relieve 
trial judges of the "plain and unambiguous mandate contained in rule 17(g)(6) that the 
jury be instructed at the close of the evidence." Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, ^ [26 & n.6, 84 
P.3d 841 (citing other courts that have identically interpreted comparable provisions). 
Here, the trial judge gave the jurors several preliminary instructions on the law, 
addressing such matters as the credibility of evidence and witnesses, the burden of proof, 
the presumption of innocence, and definitions of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. R. 
184-86. He then gave the jury the remaining instructions at the close of the evidence. R 
267: 294. In plain violation of Rule 17(g)(6), the trial judge failed to repeat the 
preliminary instructions, including those addressing the basic legal principles necessary 
to support a conviction. Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, Tf26, 84 P.3d 841. 
B. The Trial Judge's Failure to Repeat the Jury 
Instructions at the Close of the Evidence 
Violated Due Process of Law. 
Because the plain language of Rule 17(g)(6) required the trial judge to repeat the 
instructions at the close of the case, the trial judge committed an "obvious" error in 
failing to re-instruct the jury on the law. Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, Hf24-26, 84 P.3d 841; 
Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, ffl|6, 16-18, 18 P.3d 1123. As arbiters of the law, trial judges 
have an affirmative "duty to instruct the jury on the law applicable to the facts of the 
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case." State v. Squire, 888 P.2d 1102, 1104 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Thus, under the plain 
error test, this Court need only decide whether absent the trial judge's omissions a 
different verdict is "reasonably likely." HelmicL 2000 UT 70, Tf9, 9 P.3d 164. But, 
Reyes clouds this issue because this Court specifically declined in that case to resolve 
whether the absence of closing instructions violated due process of law. 2004 UT App 8, 
1fff26, n.7, 84 P.3d 841. Instead, this Court found a violation of Rule 17(g)(6), applied a 
simple harmlessness standard, and concluded that the failure to re-instruct the jury did 
not establish a reasonable probability of a different verdict under the facts of that case. 
Idat1HJ27-29. 
Nevertheless, due process principles require a more scrutinizing standard of 
review. Due process requires, at its core, that jurors presume the defendant's innocence 
and hold the State to its burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. 
Nelson, 587 N.W.2d 439, 445 (S.D. 1998). B y not instructing the jurors on these 
concepts at the close of the evidence, the trial judge deprived the jury of the opportunity 
to afford Robert his fundamental due process rights. Id 
Significantly, the Reyes court found no cases that have rejected a due process 
right to re-instruct jurors at the close of the evidence. In fact, the cases that this Court 
principally relied on have found due process violations when trial judges fail to repeat 
jury instructions on the presumption of innocence, the State's burden of proof, and proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, ffi[26 n.6, 84 P.3d 841. Failing to 
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re-instruct the jury on these rights deprives criminal defendants of the constitutional right 
"to a fair trial." Nelson. 587 N.W.2d at 445; see also State v. Woolcock. 518 A.2d 1377, 
1386 (Conn. 1986) (requiring closing instructions on the law because fair trial is implicit 
in the concept of due process); Little v. State. 498 S.E.2d 284, 287 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) 
(failure to re-instruct on the presumption of innocence, the State's burden of proof, and 
the meaning of reasonable doubt is a "violation of the defendant's state and federal 
constitutional due process rights."); People v. Newman, 385 N.E.2d 598, 599 (N.Y. 
1978) ("the fundamental nature of the constitutional precept that each essential element 
of a crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt" requires reinstructing). 
The primary jurisdiction (Arizona) that this Court relied on in Reyes is in full 
agreement. In fact, the reasoning that this Court adopted from Arizona emphasizes that 
due process principles require repeating jury instructions: 
"Where elementary legal principles that will govern the 
proceedings are given to the jury as a part of the orientation, the 
trial judge must repeat all such legal principles in its charge to 
the jury, where such legal principles include matters of law vital 
to the rights of a defendant." 
Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, f25, 84 P.3d 841 (quoting State v. Marquez . 660 P.2d 1243, 
1249 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983)). Arizona now explicitly requires instructions on due-process 
based principles at the close of the evidence. See, e.g.. State v. Romanosky, 859 P.2d 
741, 743 (Ariz. 1993); State v. Johnson. 842 P.2d 1287, 1289 (Ariz. 1992). 
Due process further demands jury instructions at the close of the evidence because 
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this practice has become so imbedded in the fabric of the criminal law as to be 
constitutionally-required. Due process guarantees such time-honored practices when the 
failure to apply the procedure "' offends [a] principle of justice so rooted in the traditions 
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.'" Patterson v. New York . 
432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977) (quoting Snvder v. Massachusetts , 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). 
American courts have instructed jurors on the law at the close of the evidence since the 
beginning of our country. Neil P. Cohen, The Timing of Jury Instructions. 67 Tenn. L. 
Rev. 681, 684, 694 (2000); B. Michael Dann, "Learning Lessons" and "Speaking 
Rights": Creating Educated and Democratic Juries. 68 Ind. LJ. 1229, 1256, 1258 (1993). 
Utah has followed suit. See Utah R. Crim. Proc. 17(g)(6); Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-
17(g)(6) (1982); Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-1 (1953); Utah Comp. L. § 4845 (1888). 
Accordingly, this "historical tradition [and] contemporary practice" establish a due 
process right to instruct the jury on the law at the close of the evidence. Parke v. Ralev. 
506 U.S. 20, 32 0992); see Medina v. California. 505 U.S. 437, 446 (1992). 
Based on these principles, the trial judge below deprived Robert of his due 
process right to instruct the jury. Providing the jury the written instructions served as no 
substitute for this due process right because trial judges cannot be assured that the jurors 
actually read the instructions. Nelson. 587 N.W.2d at 445; Johnson. 842 P.2d at 1289. 
Likewise, "the brevity of the tr ial . . . or [] the fact that lawyers have argued the 
instructions in summation" do not relieve trial judges of their duty to instruct the jury at 
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the close of the case. Johnson. 842 P.2d at 1289. Here, for example, the trial lasted two 
full days and the jury heard testimony from five witnesses. None of these alternate 
measures replace judges' affirmative "duty to instruct the jury on the law applicable to 
the facts of the case." Squire. 888 P.2d at 1104. The jury can only "discharge its duty as 
factfinder" when the trial judge "fully and completely give[s] the jury all instructions 
which are relevant and necessary for the jury to weigh the evidence" and make an 
informed decision. State v. Owens. 632 N.E.2d 1301, 1305 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993). 
C. The Failure to Re-instruct the Jury 
Constituted Structural Error, and. In Any 
Event Was Not Harmless Beyond A 
Reasonable Doubt 
Having established a constitutional violation, reversal is required because the trial 
judge's failure to instruct the jury renders a different verdict not only likely but certain 
under the plain error test. Garcia. 2001 UT App 19, ffl[6, 16-18, 18 P.3d 1123 . As with 
the erroneous reasonable doubt instructions, reversal is required as a matter of law 
because "a guilty verdict [] was never in fact rendered" below. Sullivan. 508 U.S. at 
279. The absence of instructions and the jury's consequent failure to understand its 
constitutional role "'vitiate[d] all the jury's findings.'" Peterson. 673 N.W.2d at 487 
(quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana. 508 U.S. 275, 281 (1993) (emphasis in original)). 
Even if no structural error occurred, prejudice should be presumed when trial 
judges fail to instruct jurors on the due process rights to be presumed innocent, the 
State's burden of proving guilt, and the meaning of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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State v. Romanoskv, 859 P.2d 741, 744 (Ariz. 1993). Given the "paramount 
importance" of these rights, Arizona courts have ruled that the failure to read them to the 
jury at the close of the evidence requires reversal to ensure that defendants were 
convicted within constitutional constraints. Id As noted above, this Court relied on 
Arizona law in determining that judges must instruct jurors at the close of the evidence. 
Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, %L5, 84 P.3d 841. 
At the very least, reversal is required because the State must show harmlessness 
beyond a reasonable doubt for violations of nonstructural constitutional errors. State v. 
Saddler. 2003 UT App 82, ][27, 67 P.3d 1025. S pecifically, the State has the burden of 
showing "beyond a reasonable doubt that the failure to reinstruct at the end of the trial 
did not influence the jury's verdict." Romanosky, 859 P.2d at 743; see also Little, 498 
S.E.2d at 288; Owens, 632 N.E.2d at 1306. Even viewing all of the evidence favorably 
to the jury's verdict reveals numerous conflicts and weaknesses in the State's case. That 
evidence shows that Robert drove a car that was used to rob a stranger. As Robert drove, 
Karl communicated to Robert that he wanted to rob Brandan. R. 267: 259-63. Knowing 
this information, Robert offered to stop the vehicle and adjust Brandan's seat. R. 266: 
94-96. Robert then parked the car in a deserted industrial area and adjusted the seat as 
Karl sneaked up on Brandan, struck him in the head, and robbed him. IdL at 96-99. 
Additionally, although Brandan gave numerous conflicting statements, he 
maintained throughout the proceedings that Robert stole the CDs. Id. at 263: 9, 14-15; 
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265: 38; 266: 99-100. Brandan claimed further at the second trial that Robert appeared 
"aggressive" during the encounter. IcL at 149, 152. Then, when Karl stated, "Go get the 
gun," Brandan saw Robert searching under the car front seat. Id. at 101. Shortly 
thereafter, Brandan felt cold steel on the back of his head which he "assumed" was a gun. 
Id. at 103-04, 130. Finally, although Robert stopped Karl from undressing Brandan, 
Robert told Brandan not to turn around and try to identify the car or the license plate 
number. IdL at 132, 150-52; 267: 253. 
Despite this evidence, the State cannot show beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Robert was a party to the robbery or had the requisite knowledge and intent. All of the 
"facts" in support of the jury's verdict are founded on Brandan's assumption that Robert 
knowingly and intentionally participated in the robbery. In particular, Brandan's initial 
statements to the USANA security guard and to police that "two men" or "the suspects" 
had robbed him show that Brandan presupposed that Robert was a co-conspirator, 
despite the actual facts. R. 267: 170-72, 221, 226. Likewise, although Brandan never 
saw a gun or anyone holding a gun, he "assumed" that Robert held the gun to the back of 
his head. R. 266: 103-04, 140. Brandan's belief that Robert was involved was based on 
nothing more than an "inference upon inference." State v. George, 481 P.2d 667, 667 
(Utah 1971). Utah appellate courts have repeatedly rejected such hypothesizing as mere 
"conjecture" that constitutes reasonable doubt. State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 344 (Utah 
1997); State v. Lavman. 953 P.2d 782, 791 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
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Brandan's speculative assumptions, in turn, tainted the only allegation that could 
possibly support that Robert was an active participant in the robbery: the taking of the 
CDs. Throughout the proceedings, Brandan was hesitant and contradicted himself over 
Robert's involvement. Brandan only claimed that Robert had taken the CDs after the 
prosecutor repeatedly prompted him at the preliminary hearing. At that hearing, Brandan 
asserted that Karl had taken "everything" including the CDs. R. 263: 9. Even after the 
prosecutor pressed Brandan twice to explain Robert's involvement, Brandan claimed 
Robert had not taken anything. Id Brandan accused Robert for the first time of taking 
the CDs only after the prosecutor later suggested that Robert and Karl had taken different 
items. IcL at 12. On cross-examination, Brandan contradicted himself again and asserted 
that the "passenger" had taken the CDs. Id at 15. When Brandan corrected himself and 
again accused Robert, defense counsel asked Brandan if he was sure. Id, Brandan 
expressed doubt and gave a wholly non-responsive answer: "I am not sure. I am not sure 
if they were in the car or not." Id Finally, on redirect examination, Brandan claimed for 
the first time, "The passenger took my CD player and my razor. And I heard the driver 
say, 'I am keeping these,' and took my CD's." Id at 25. 
Brandan's failure to accuse Robert of taking anything until the prosecutor 
repeatedly suggested it seriously undermines Brandan's claim that Robert knowingly and 
actively assisted Karl in the robbery. Those suggestions coupled with Brandan's mere 
assumption that Robert conspired with Karl cast strong doubt on his actual, independent 
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recollection. In fact, the evidence shows that Brandan's memory of Robert was, at best, 
hazy. The robbery admittedly "terrified" Brandan and caused him to hyperventilate and 
prevented him from speaking. R. 266: 105-06; 267: 169, 190. Brandan also conceded at 
the preliminary hearing that he concentrated on Karl and the knife rather than Robert. R. 
263: 9. Because of his focus on the knife-wielding Karl, Brandan paid little attention to 
Robert and could not identify any of Robert's acts. 
Brandan exhibited further confusion about who took the CDs when he testified at 
the second trial that he gave Karl his "CD's, my radio, my wallet, everything I had." R. 
266: 99; Addendum D. Although Brandan corrected himself and accused Robert, he 
again explained his confusion through the non-responsive answer, "And then I don't 
remember where my CD's were. I think they were in the car." Icl Thus, even after 
speaking with the police and testifying at a preliminary hearing and two jury trials, 
Brandan still could not clearly identify who took the CDs nor could he give a responsive 
explanation for his confusion. 
Brandan's habit of adding additional details to each subsequent statement further 
questions the accuracy of his perceptions and memory of Robert actively participating in 
the crime. Specifically, Brandan did not mention Robert's thumbing through the CDs 
until the first jury trial. R. 265: 38. At that proceeding, he similarly added to his story 
that Robert made a U-turn at the initial encounter. Id. at 22, 70. He also changed the 
time of the incident from 6:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. R. 263: 6; 265: 46; 266: 110. The 
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record establishes that Robert was cited for speeding at 8:34 p.m. R. 265: 121. 
Brandan's poor memory again revealed itself when he changed his claims about 
recognizing Robert from Magna, then to Woods Cross High School, and finally to the 
job corps. R. 266: 23. He then contradicted his preliminary hearing testimony and 
claimed that Karl pointed the knife at Brandan's chest and neck rather than first pointing 
it at Karl's own chest. IcL at 32-36, 62. Further contrary to his statement to police and 
prior testimony, Brandan changed the number of lost CDs from 130 to 250 down to 200. 
LI at 21, 52-53. Similarly, at the second trial, Brandan added for the first time that 
Robert appeared "aggressive." Id. at 149, 152. Brandan's repeated adding of detail to fit 
his assumptions about Robert and the State's suggested theory of a conspiracy suggests 
that he, indeed, focused his attention on Karl, who was obviously in charge and posed 
the most immediate threat to Brandan's personal safety. 
Remembering additional facts appears especially unlikely given Brandan's fear 
and terror at the time of the robbery. Id at 67, 74. Scientific research establishes that 
memory diminishes over time and that recall is particularly low when, as here, the 
observer focuses his or her attention on another person, and fear is the prevailing 
emotion. State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 780-81 (Utah 1991). Attention is even more 
diminished when a deadly weapon is used because the weapon distracts the observer. 
State v. Nelson. 950 P.2d 940, 942 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
Brandan's improving memory and continued confusion over who took the CDs, 
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prevent the State from showing that the failure to re-instruct the jury on the law was 
harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt. Romanoskv, 859 P.2d at 744. In fact, 
Brandan's claims are inconsistent with the undisputed facts of this case. Karl was the 
principal actor throughout the incident from the time he offered Brandan a ride, to 
buying him an ice cream cone, explaining that he needed to visit a friend, robbing 
Brandan at knifepoint, ordering Robert and Brandan what to do, and commanding 
Brandan to remove his sweat shirt. And, perhaps, most telling, it is highly unlikely that 
Karl would order Robert not to take the CDs given Karl's resolve to rob Brandan. 
Rather, Karl would have encouraged Robert to steal them. 
The more reasonable conclusion supports Robert's claims that he repeatedly told 
Karl to stop the robbery and that he himself did not participate in it. Robert's animosity 
toward Karl for stealing his car is further consistent with his disharmony rather than 
collusion. Robert's outburst and resentment about being Karl's "chauffeur" cements the 
rift in their relationship. R. 263: 21; 265: 26; 266: 91. 
Robert's actions before the robbery and his subsequent cooperation with 
authorities further support his innocence. Robert not only gave Officer Cowan his 
correct name and a rental agreement, he also offered his name to Brandan, unlike Karl 
who gave a false name. R. 266: 92, 119; 267: 237-38. To say the least, providing his 
name would be rather careless if Robert knew of Karl's plan to rob Brandan. Moreover, 
Robert fully cooperated after the crime; he contacted police, waived his Miranda rights, 
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and explained that he tried to thwart Karl. R. 267: 247-48, 263. Subsequently, Robert 
voluntarily turned himself over to the custody of Pretrial Services. R. 263: 40. These 
actions fully support Robert's claims that Karl presented his plan to rob Brandan after 
returning the pants at the mall and that Robert had no intent to participate in the crime. 
At the very least, the State cannot show harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt 
because no other evidence supports Brandan's claims. When a conviction relies on one 
witness's veracity "and there is not 'other evidence [to support] the defendant's 
conviction,' [State v.] RammeL 721 P.2d [498,] 501 [(Utah 1986]," this Court will not 
find harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Iorg, 801 P.2d 938, 942 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). Because of Brandan's assumptions and the holes in the State's case, the trial 
judge's failure to instruct the jury was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, 
the judge's omission prejudices the defense and constituted plain error. Garcia, 2001 UT 
App 19, ^ 16, 18P.3dll23. . 
Even if the trial judge had not plainly erred, defense counsel was ineffective for 
failing to object to the lack of closing instructions. Templin, 805 P.2d at 187. Because 
Utah law plainly requires instructions at the close of the evidence, defense counsel had 
valid grounds for objecting. Utah R. Cri. P. 17(g)(6). And, as just shown, the failure to 
re-instruct the jury on basic constitutional principles prejudiced the defense in this 
factually uncertain case. Accordingly, defense counsel deprived Robert of his right to 
effective assistance and a new trial is required. Templin, 805 P.2d at 187. 
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III. THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRONEOUSLY LIMITED THE 
JURORS' DUTY TO DETERMINE WITNESS 
CREDIBILITY AND FAILED TO ADEQUATELY 
ENSURE THAT THE JURORS WERE IMPARTIAL 
The trial judge further deprived Robert of a fair trial when he misinformed the 
jurors not to consider Brandan's mother's coaching for any purpose, including 
determining Brandan's credibility. Determining witness credibility, including the 
existence of possible coaching, is within the jury's sole province. The judge's refusal to 
interview the jurors or hold an evidentiary hearing deprived Robert of his right to a fair 
trial. Because the State's case depended entirely on Brandan's veracity, the trial judge's 
mishandling of the coaching issue was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Utah law does not specifically address the trial court's duties when an audience 
member coaches a witness. But, at they very, Utah statutory law, and the state and 
federal constitutions guarantee accused persons the right to a speedy public trial by an 
"impartial jury." U.S. Const. Amend. VI; Utah Const, art. I, §12; State v. Woollev. 810 
P.2d 440, 443 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6(l)(f) (1999). Because 
juror bias arises most commonly in jury voir dire, the case law in Utah focuses on trial 
judges' duties in selecting impartial jurors. But, the duty to ensure an impartial trial does 
not dissipate after the jury is chosen. Trial judges have "a duty to detect and investigate 
the potential for partiality " State v. King, 2004 UT App 210, |25, P.3d .4 
4Appellate counsel has used a similar analogy in State v. Cruz, No. 20020735-SC, 
in which the appellant challenges juror bias that was discovered after jury selection. 
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The jurisdictions that have specifically addressed coaching have concluded that 
because "coaching is a matter which bears upon a witness5 credibility[,] the question of 
coaching is one for the jury." State v. Rodriguez, 509 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Neb. 1993) (see list 
of cases cited therein). "When the trial court's attention is drawn to the fact that a 
witness is being coached by a spectator at the trial, the trial court has a duty to take 
curative action." Id. at 3-4. The need for action derives not from the wrongfulness of 
the coaching but, rather, the biasing effect on the juror's ability to assess the coached 
witness's credibility. Sharp v. Commonwealth. 849 S.W.2d 542, 547 (Ky. 1993). 
Trial courts have discretion in deciding how to respond to audience members' 
coaching of witnesses. Sharp. 849 S.W.2d at 547; State v. Boone. 820 P.2d 930, 932 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) (discussing disruptive audience member). B ut, the failure to take 
curative action in close evidentiary cases can be so "egregious and inimical to the 
concept of a fair trial that [it] cannot be disregarded in the name of trial court discretion." 
Sharp. 849 S.W.2d at 547. Judges have dealt with coaching by instructing the jury, 
allowing cross-examination on coaching, interviewing the person coaching, individual 
jurors, or all jurors collectively, obtaining affidavits from jurors, and conducting 
evidentiary hearings. See United States v. Rutherford. 371 F.3d 634, (9th Cir. 2004) 
(affidavits from jurors who were intimated by IRS agents in courtroom); United States v. 
Tolliver. 61 F.3d 1189, 1208 (5th Cir. 1995) (cautionary instruction); Sharp, 849 S.W.2d 
at 547 (interviewed coach); Rodriguez. 509 N.W.2d at 3 (evidentiary hearing). 
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In this case, the trial judge instructed the jury not to consider any audience 
reactions in determining credibility and then allowed defense counsel to cross-examine 
Brandan about the coaching. The trial judge abused its discretion in both instances. 
Although the trial judge had discretion to respond to the coaching, he also had a legal 
duty to correctly "instruct the jury on the law applicable to the facts of the case." Squire, 
888 P.2d at 1104. Accordingly, this Court reviews jury instructions for correctness. Id_. 
The instruction here erroneously restricted jurors' exclusive role to determine 
witness credibility. Rodriguez, 509 N.W.2d at 7. "[T]he jury serves as the exclusive 
judge of both the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given particular evidence." 
State v. Yanez. 2002 UT App 50,^[19, 42 P.3d 1248 (quoting State v. Workman . 852 
P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993)). Contrary to this role, the trial judge's instruction barred 
jurors from considering the coaching for any purpose: "Jurors are to accept as evidence 
or rely on in their deliberations only testimony and other evidence presented and 
accepted in court. They may not consider gestures, facial expressions, or any other 
demonstration by any other person in the courtroom." Id. at 145-46. 
This instruction not only forbade the jurors from considering unsworn testimony, 
but also prohibited them from weighing Brandan's mother's coaching for any other 
purpose, including assessing Brandan's credibility. R. 266: 144. As the prosecutor 
conceded below, coaching "goes to the credibility of the witness and the weight of the 
evidence." IcL at 141. When, as here, the trial judge's comments affect the credibility of 
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a witness, "the judge invades the province of the jury." Rodriguez, 509 N.W.2d at 5. 
The remaining instructions similarly billed to sufficiently fKadvise[] the jury on 
the law.5" State v. Penn. 2004 UT App 212, Tf28 94 P.3d 308 (quoting Laws v. Blanding , 
893 P.2d 1083, 1086 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)). The trial judge did instruct the jury on 
deciding whether to believe a witness based on such matters as truthfulness, demeanor, 
and consistency. R. 185. However, numerous other instructions repeatedly limited the 
jury's deliberations "solely [to] the evidence presented at the trial." R. 182-84. Also, the 
trial judge specifically instructed the jurors on the coaching "to accept as evidence or rely 
on in their deliberations only testimony and other evidence presented and accepted in 
court." R. 145. These instructions, when taken as a whole, erroneously informed the 
jurors that the mother's coaching was not evidence upon which the jury could rely for 
any purpose, including assessing Brandan's credibility. Rodriguez, 509 N.W.2d at 5. 
This Court's decision in State v. Boone. 820 P.2d 930 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), 
illustrates the inadequacy of the instructions below. In that case, an audience member 
commented on the merits of the prosecution and gestured during defense counsel's 
closing arguments. 1(1 at 934-35. This Court ruled that the trial judge adequately 
addressed possible prejudice to the jury when he "instructed the jury to limit their 
deliberations to the evidence presented during trial" and he explained the jury's duty to 
weigh the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. Id. at 935. This Court premised 
the lack of prejudice on the judge's "specific factual findings" that none of the jurors had 
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seen or heard the disruptive behavior. Ici. 
In contrast, at least one juror below, and possibly others, saw Brandan's mother's 
coaching. Also, unlike Boone, the trial judge could not rule out prejudice to the jury 
because he did not witness the mother's coaching or the jurors' reaction to it. R. 266: 
136. Adding to these problems, the trial judge erroneously limited the jury's assessment 
of Brandan's credibility. Further, credibility was not at issue in Boone because the 
disruption was limited to defense counsel's closing arguments. Here, the coaching 
occurred during the key witness's testimony. Thus, unlike in Boone, this Court cannot 
be assured that the coaching did not prejudice the jury and that the instructions 
adequately conveyed that the coaching was relevant in determining Brandan's credibility. 
Rodriguez provides a comparable example impairing the jury's ability to decide 
witness credibility in a coaching incident. There, defense counsel objected because a 
police officer who was seated at the prosecution table was signaling answers to a 
cooperating co-conspirator who testified at a drug trial. Rodriguez. 509 N.W.2d at 3. In 
front of the jury, the trial judge responded to the objection, "No, he wasn't. I was 
watching him." Id The trial judge later allowed defense counsel and the prosecutor to 
present to the jury witnesses to the coaching and allowed cross-examination on the 
coaching. Id, at 3-4. The Nebraska Supreme Court ruled that the trial judge's ruling that 
no coaching had occurred improperly bolstered the witness's credibility which was "an 
issue for the jury to decide." IcL at 4. The comments were particularly harmful because 
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the co-conspirator was the sole witness to the alleged crime and, therefore, "the 
prosecution could succeed only if the jury believed the testimony o f the witness. IcL_ 
This case is nearly identical. Although the trial judge below did not comment on 
Brandan's credibility, his forbidding the jurors from considering the mother's coaching 
eliminated the coaching from the jury's deliberations. Thus, like the judge's comments 
in Rodriguez, the trial judge here restricted the jury's credibility assessment of the only 
witness to the alleged crimes. 
Moreover, the trial judge's decision to allow defense counsel to cross-examine 
Brandan failed to remedy the erroneous jury instruction. "Ordinarily, permitting 
[coaching] to be raised on cross-examination will constitute an effective cure." 
Rodriguez, 509 N.W.2d at 4. But, cross-examination is ineffective when the trial court 
limits the jury's credibility assessment of the State's sole witness to a crime. Rodriguez 
held that the judge's comment that no coaching had occurred "blunted the defense's 
weapon of cross-examination." Id. at 5. 
Like the judge's comments in Rodriguez, the instruction limiting the jury's 
credibility assessment of Brandan inoculated defense counsel's efforts to impeach 
Brandan's credibility. Likewise, counsel's cross-examination was ineffective because, 
just as defense counsel predicted, Brandan denied that he saw his mother's coaching or 
was affected by it. R. 266: 142, 146. Brandan's denials coupled with the instruction 
forbidding the jury from weighing the coaching nullified the cross-examination. 
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The trial judge further abused his discretion in failing to grant defense counsel's 
request to interview all the jurors for possible bias. R. 266: 138. Again borrowing from 
Utah law on jury voir dire, Utah appellate courts have repeatedly ruled that, " [o]nce a 
juror's impartiality has been placed in doubt, a trial judge must investigate by further 
questions to determine if the juror has merely 'light impressions' or impressions that are 
'strong and deep' and which will affect the juror's impartiality." State v. King, 2004 UT 
App 210, Tfl4, P.3d (internal quotations omitted). Because the duty to inquire 
attaches whenever even "possible bias" arises, it must be "liberally exercise[d]." 
Saunders, 1999 UT 59, ^ 43, 992 P.2d 951. But, the only way to determine if any other 
jurors had seen the coaching and were biased by it was to question the jurors themselves. 
Despite an "indication" that Brandan's mother's coaching could have affected jurors' 
partiality, the trial judge refused to interview jurors. King, 2004 UT App 210, ^[15. 
The policies supporting the law on improper contacts between jurors and 
interested parties support the need for an evidentiary hearing. In State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 
277, 281 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court created a rebuttable presumption of 
prejudice when jurors have "more than the most incidental contact" with interested 
parties. This Court has summarized the two main reasons supporting the presumption as: 
(1) "it is difficult, if not impossible, to prove how an improper contact may have 
influenced a juror;" and, (2) "[i]f improper juror contact is not prevented, a doubt may 
exist in the mind of the losing party, and the public as a whole, as to whether the 
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defendant was given a fair trial." State v. Swain. 835 P.2d 1009, 1011 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992). But, the overriding concern in Pike was preventing "breeding a sense of 
familiarity that can clearly affect one's judgment as to credibility. . . . " 712 P.2d at 281. 
For these reasons, this Court has ruled that although trial courts are not required to 
conduct a hearing, "in most instances [a hearing] would be helpful to the court" in 
determining possible bias. Logan City v. Carlsen. 799 P.2d 224, 227 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). In fact, almost all of the cases that have reviewed improper juror contacts have 
held some sort of evidentiary hearing. Id. (listing cases); see, e.g.. State v. Shipp. 2004 
UT 40, Tf4, 86 P.3d 763; State v. Thomas. 777 P.2d 445, 451 (Utah 1989) (requiring a 
hearing when jurors fail to disclose possible bias during jury voir dire). 
The Pike line of cases directly translates to this case. Just like improper juror 
contacts, it is impossible to determine how coaching influences a juror without 
interviewing the jury. Without a hearing, courts are left to "conjecture as to possible 
bias. . . ." Carlsen. 799 P.2d at 226. Coaching also "creates an appearance of collusion 
or impropriety" that casts doubt on the fairness of the trial, both to the public and the 
defendant. Swain. 835 P.2d at 1011. The only way to resolve these concerns is for the 
trial court to conduct a hearing and have the jurors testify about the coaching. 
Even more importantly, just as with improper juror contacts, the overriding 
concern here is the jurors' ability to fairly assess Brandan's "credibility." Pike. 712 P.2d 
at 281. This concern for determining credibility led Utah courts to presume prejudice. 
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Id. This same concern applies to this case in which the trial judge instructed the jury not 
to consider the coaching in determining Brandan's credibility. 
The trial judge's handling of the coaching requires reversal because the State 
cannot show that the erroneous instruction or the failure to hold a hearing was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. When, as here, the trial court limits the jury's credibility 
assessment of a coached witness whose testimony provides the only evidence of a crime, 
the violation is so "egregious and inimical to the concept of a fair trial that [it] cannot be 
disregarded in the name of trial court discretion." Sharp, 849 S.W.2d at 547. This Court 
recently expressed identical sentiments in a case of potential juror bias and found 
prejudice when "a witness's testimony played a small but critical and controverted role" 
in the prosecution. Shipp. 2004 UT App 40, ^ 18, 86 P.3d 763. Brandan's role was not 
only "critical and controverted" but was the only evidence supporting Robert's guilt. 
Brandan's credibility was so vital to the State's case that the trial judge's errors prevent a 
showing of harmlessness even under a simple reasonably-likely standard of review. 
Sharp soundly supports this conclusion. In that case, a family friend who sat in 
the audience at trial coached the alleged child rape victim. 849 S.W.2d at 546-47. The 
Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that because the child's testimony was "crucial" to 
establishing the government's case, "[her] demeanor during testimony and her ability to 
withstand cross-examination inevitably influenced the jury as to whether or to what 
extent she should be believed." Id. at 547. That court reversed the convictions because it 
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was "impossible to say that the witness did not derive confidence and assurance from" 
the family friend's "encouragement, approval and comfort at the time her credibility was 
being assessed by the jury." IdL 
Like the child witness in Sharp, Brandan's credibility, perceptions, and memory 
provided the only evidence supporting guilt. Moreover, Brandan admitted throughout 
the proceedings that he was nervous, had not paid attention to Robert during the robbery, 
and that his memory of the incident was poor. Thus, any encouragement or help that he 
received from his mother was "crucial" to assessing his believability. IcL A different 
verdict was more than likely because the trial judge "misle[d] the jury to the prejudice of 
the complaining party [and] insufficiently or erroneously advisef] the jury on the law." 
Penn, 2004 UT App 212, f 28, 94 P.3d 308 (quoting Laws. 893 P.2d at 1086) (internal 
citations omitted). 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant Robert Berry requests this Court to reverse his convictions and remand 
this matter for a new trial because the erroneous jury instructions, trial judge's failure to 
instruct the jury on the law, the faulty instruction on coaching prejudiced his defense. 
Dated this Jfl^day of August, 2003. 
KENT R. HART 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: For the record, this is the matter of 
State of Utah vs. Robert Kelton Berry. And appearances for the 
record, please. 
MR. NEILL: Rob Neill for the State. 
MR. QUINLAN: Paul Quinlan for Mr. Karl Berry. 
MS. GUSTIN: Susanne Gustin for Robert Berry. 
THE COURT: All right. I did receive an Amended 
Information that was just sworn to me by Officer Johnson. 
Ms. Gustin and Mr. Quinlan, have you both received copies of 
those Informations? 
MS. GUSTIN: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Any objection to the Amended Information? 
MS. GUSTIN: No. 
THE COURT: Mr. Quinlan? 
MR. QUINLAN: No. 
THE COURT: For the record, the case against Karl 
Berry is case 031100784. The case against Robert Kelton Berry 
is No. 031100783. Are both sides ready to proceed this 
morning? 
MR. NEILL: Yes, your Honor. 
MS. GUSTIN: Yes, your Honor. 
MR. QUINLAN: Yes. 
THE COURT: Any preliminary matters before we take 
4 
testimony? 
MR. NEILL: I donft believe so, your Honor. 
MR. QUINLAN: Just ask the exclusionary rule be 
invoked. I don't know who all is in here. 
MR. NEILL: We are intending on calling two 
witnesses: One is our victim, who we would request be 
permitted to stay, if he wishes; and our case manager, 
Detective Frank Johnson. 
THE COURT: Under the rules I believe they are both 
entitled to stay. 
Call your first witness. 
MR. NEILL: The State's first witness will be Phillip 
Brandan Booth. 
• • * 
PHILLIP BRANDAN BOOTH, 
called as a witness by the State, having been duly sworn, was 
examined and testified as follows: 
• * * 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. NEILL: 
Q Could you please state your name and spell it for the 
record? 
A Yes. It is Phillip Brandan Booth, P-h-i-1-l-i-p 
B-r-a-n-d-a-n B-o-o-t-h. 
Q Do you go by Brandan? 
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A Yes, I do. 
Q Brandan, I would like to draw your attention to 
March 12 of 2003, this past March. Were you on that day in the 
area of 900 West and 2600 South? 
A Yes, I was. 
Q And could you tell the Court what you were doing on 
that day in that area? 
A I was trying to walk to a bus stop, because the bus 
had quit running. 
Q Were you alone? 
A Yes, I was. 
Q Approximately what time of day was this? 
A It was around dusk, about 6:00. 
Q And did you have any belongings with you? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q What belongings did you have with you? 
A I had my CDf s, my CD player, and my razor. 
Q While you were walking in that area, did anything 
unusual happen? 
A Yes. Some kids came and asked me if I would like a 
ride. 
Q Tell us how — were they walking? They were 
obviously in a vehicle? 
A Yes, they were. 
Q What type of a vehicle was it, do you recall? 
6 
A 
Hyundai, 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
didn't. 
Q 
point? 
A 
A Hyundai Sonata or Escalade. It was a midsize 
What color was it? 
It was white. 
Did you recognize any of these two individuals? 
I thought I did at first. But once I got in, I 
Did you have any conversation with them at that 
Yeah. 
Q Could you tell us about that? 
A He said, "We got to stop at the mall, and we will 
take you all the way out to Magna if you would like." And I 
said, "All right." They seemed friendly. 
Q Where were they seated in the vehicle? 
A In the front seats. 
Q So what happened at that point? 
A I don't understand. What do you mean? 
Q They mentioned that they had to go to the mall? 
A Oh, yes. They went to the mall, and the passenger 
went and returned something and got some money. Do you want me 
to continue? 
Q Yes. 
A All right. Then we went over to McDonald's, and they 
bought some hamburgers for themselves. That's after they said, 
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"Oh, no, that is no problem. We are goxng out there, anyways, 
to Magna." Then they turned off, on a road, and I kind of got 
fishy, and I didn!t know what was going on. And they drove 
around right by USANA, and they got out, and they said, "Let me 
fix the seat for you." And then the passenger came over and 
hit me in my face, pulled a knife out on me. 
Q What did he do — well, I will stop you real quick. 
They said that they wanted to fix your seat. What was wrong 
with your seat? 
A Well, there was like a bumper in the back from, I 
guess, from the driver's car. And the seats were folded down. 
You now how they fold down into the trunk so it would stick up. 
And that!s why. 
Q So where was this area that they pulled into, that 
you thought was a little fishy? 
A It was in the industrial district, just closed-down 
buildings and stuff like that, or closed — not closed for 
business, but closed for the day. 
Q Was that still within the boundaries of Salt Lake 
County? 
A Yes, it was. 
Q So you mentioned that the passenger got out and hit 
you? 
A Yes, he did. 
Q Did he say anything to you before he did that? 
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A No. He just caught me. He caught me blind-sided. 
Q Then after he hit you did he say anything at that 
point? 
A He just pulled out a knife. He said, "What do you 
got? What do you got?" 
Q What did he do with the knife? 
A Held it like this. Not to me, but to his chest like 
this, like he was going to cut me with it. 
Q And then what happened? 
A After I gave him most of my stuff he said, "Go get 
the gun. Get the gun." 
Q Who was he — 
A He was talking to the driver. 
Q And you gave him your stuff. What did you give him? 
A I gave him my CD player, my CD!s, everything I had on 
me, my wallet. 
Q When he had the knife out did you feel threatened by 
that? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q And he told the other, "Go get the gun." And then 
what happened? 
A Then they made me stand in the corner. 
Q In the corner of where? 
A There was a truck, like a bay for a truck, and there 
was a corner, and it was like a loading dock, and it was like a 
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door, and then they made me stand in the corner over by the 
truck. 
Q And then once they had you stand over in that corner, 
what happened? 
A I felt the gun on the back of my neck, and they got 
in, they said, "You move, you're dead," and took off. 
Q So who had the gun? 
A I donf t know. 
Q And you said you felt the gun. How did it feel? 
A Like cold steel, like a gun. I don't know how else, 
how I could explain it. 
Q And where was — where did you feel that against 
your — 
A The back of my head to my neck. 
Q Did they say anything when that gun was put on you? 
A Yeah. They said, "If you move, you're dead." 
Q Do you remember who had the gun, whether it was the 
driver or the passenger? 
A I donf t know. I didn!t see the gun. 
Q So where were you facing when that was going on? 
A I was facing the corner of the building. 
Q What happened at that point? 
A Then they got in the car and drove off. I ran and 
got the security guard at USANA. 
Q And they took your belongings — 
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A Yes, they did. 
Q — with them? Now, Brandan, would you recognize 
either of these individuals if you saw them again? 
A Yes. I picked them out of a lineup. 
Q And would you recognize them if you saw them again 
face to face? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you recognize anyone in this courtroom who was 
involved? 
A Yes, I do. 
Q Could you please tell the Court and point out what 
they are wearing? 
A This one was the driver. He is wearing a tie and a 
green and blue plaid shirt. And the other one was the 
passenger. He is in blue jail clothes. 
MR. NEILL: Your Honor, may the record reflect the 
identification of the defendants? 
THE COURT: Let's get the names for the record. 
Which defendant is wearing the plaid shirt? 
MS. GUSTIN: That's Robert Berry. 
THE COURT: All right. And then I am assuming Karl 
Berry is the gentleman in the blue jail clothes. Is that 
correct, Mr. Quinlan? 
MR. QUINLAN: Yes. 
THE COURT: Any objection to identification by the 
11 
witness? 
MS. GUSTIN: No. 
MR. QUINLAN: No. 
THE COURT: The record will reflect identification of 
both Mr. Robert Berry and Mr. Karl Berry by the witness. 
MR. NEILL: Thank you, your Honor. 
Q And just a couple more questions, Brandan. When 
Karl — when the passenger had the knife and said, "Give us 
your stuff," do you recall what the driver was doing at that 
point? 
A I wasn!t concentrating on the driver. 
Q Did you see the driver do anything else when they 
stopped and pulled the knife and asked for your stuff? 
A No. 
Q Brandan, do you recall whether anyone took 
specific — any of your specific property? Did the passenger 
take it all, did the driver participate at all? 
A The driver took my CD's, and the passenger took the 
rest. 
MR. NEILL: Thanks. 
THE COURT: Cross examination? 
• * * 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MS. GUSTIN: 
Q Mr. Booth, weren!t you hitchhiking that day? 
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A 
Q 
No, I wasn!t. 
You weren't? So you were just walking along, to go 
to the bus stop? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
outside 
A 
Q 
point? 
A 
Q 
To go to the bus stop. 
Why did you get in the car with these guys? 
I don't know. I — stupid, I guess. 
At some point did you get sick and you were vomiting 
the car or something? 
No. 
Did you get out of the car for any reason, at any 
Yes, when they were going to push the seats up. 
So that's when the passenger came over and hit you in 
the face? 
A 
Q 
Yes, it is. 
Was it Karl Berry who said, "What you got? What do 
you have?" 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
driver, 
A 
What one is Karl Berry? 
This one, the passenger. 
Yes, it is. 
What was the driver saying, anything? 
He wasn't saying anything. 
When the passenger said, "Go get the gun," to the 
did the driver do anything? 
I seen him reach under the seat. But then they made 
13 
me get 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
car. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
it got. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
in the corner. 1 
Who said, "If you move, you're dead"? 1 
The passenger, Karl. 1 
So did the driver ever say anything to you? 1 
He didn't say anything to me, no. 1 
So he never said anything to you? 1 
No. 
Did the driver say anything to the passenger? 1 
Yes. 
What did he say to the passenger? 1 
Before, they were talking, buddy-buddy talk in the J 
Were you ever asked to take any of your clothes off? 
Yes, I was. 1 
What did you take off? 1 
I started to remove my sweater, but that is as far as 
The passenger told you to do that? 1 
Yes. 
The driver told him to knock it off and told him — 1 
I didn't hear that. 1 
What about your pants? Were you ordered to take your 
1 pants off? 
A 
Q 
No, I wasn't. 
Where were the CD's? They weren't on your person, 
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I were they? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
1 you? 
A 
Q 
Yes, they were. 
They werenf t in the car? 
No. I was holding them. 
You were holding them, and the driver took them from 
No, the passenger took them. 
The passenger did? OK. So then the driver didn!t 
1 take anything from you? 1 
A 
Q 
He took the CD!s. 
You just said the passenger took the CDfs. Are you 
1 not sure? 
A 
1 or not. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
the bus 
Q 
I am not sure. I am not sure if they were in the car 
What was in your wallet? 1 
Fifteen dollars and my IDT s and cards. 1 
Were your ID's taken? J 
No, they weren? t. 1 
The $15 was taken? 1 
Yes, it was. But they threw a dollar back at me for 
ride. 1 
Did they say anything to you when they threw the 
dollar back at you? 1 
A 
1 
Yeah. They said, "Here is for the bus." 1 
And who said that to you? I 
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A I donf t remember. 
Q And it was the passenger who took the wallet; isnft 
that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q And the passenger who took the $15? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you ever hear the driver saying to the passenger 
to leave him alone, or that's enough, or anything like that? 
A I don't recall. 
MS. GUSTIN: That's all I have. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Gustin. 
Mr. Quinlan? 
* * * 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. QUINLAN: 
Q Where were you on your way to that night? 
A I was going out to my mom's. 
Q To your mom's? 
A Yes. 
Q Your mom lives in Magna? 
A Yes. 
Q Where were you coming from? 
A From a — I prefer not to answer these questions. 
MR. NEILL: We would object to the relevancy of where 
he was coming from. 
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THE COURT: I think it is permissible. I will 
instruct you to answer the question, unless there is some sort 
of an incrimination aspect, which I cannot imagine there would 
be. 
MR. NEILL: Can we approach, your Honor? 
THE COURT: Please. 
(Off-the-record discussion at the bench.) 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Booth, what I am going to 
do is instruct you not to give a specific address if it relates 
to a family member. But you can give a general location, or if 
you were at your father's house, your brother's house, your 
sister's house, or relative's house, just indicate that. But 
you do not need to give the specific address. 
THE WITNESS: I was in my father's trailer. 
THE COURT: So you had come from your father's 
trailer, then? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
Q Was it just you and your father together at that 
trailer? 
A It was just me and one of his employees. 
Q Your father was not home? 
A No, he wasn't. He lives in a house. 
Q Were you with anybody else earlier that day? 
A No, I wasn't. 
Q How long had you been at the trailer? 
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A About five hours, cleaning it out. I was cleaning it 
out. 
Q With the help of one of your father's employees? 
A Yes. 
Q You said that you thought that you recognized one of 
the individuals in the Hyundai? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q Would that have been the driver or the passenger? 
A The driver. 
Q How was it that you thought you knew him? 
A I thought I went to school with him. 
Q Was that here in Salt Lake, West Valley? 
A Yes, it was. 
Q Where was that? Where did you go to school? 
A I went to Woods Cross. 
Q Woods Cross, that's not in Salt Lake? 
A Salt Lake — I guess it is Davis County. It is not 
Salt Lake County. 
Q You thought you recognized the driver from going to 
high school with him? 
A Yes. 
Q So when the Hyundai pulled up to you, you were on the 
driverf s side of the vehicle? 
A I was on the passengerfs side. 
Q And you didn't recognize the passenger? 
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A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
No. 
Who was it that spoke to you first? 
The passenger. 
And do you recall specifically what he said? 
"Where are you going?" is what he said first. 
But you weren't hitchhiking? 
No. 
You were just walking along? 
OK, they pulled up to the side of me, and they said, 
"Would you like a ride?" Then I got in. And he said, "Where 
are you 
Q 
A 
Q 
going?" To clarify that. 
And that was all that was said at that point? 
Yes, to me. 
When was it that you realized that you didn't 
recognize the driver? 
A 
Q 
About when we got to the mall. 
Did you have any conversation with him between 
time you entered the vehicle and arriving at the mall? 
A 
Q 
And who are we talking about? 
Did you have a conversation with either of the 
defendants? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Not until we got to the mall. 
You rode in silence until the mall? 
Yes. They were talking amongst themselves. 
You never identified yourself by name? 
the 
two 
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A Oh, yes, I did. 
Q So there was some conversation immediately after — 
A Yes. They said, "Where are you going?" I said, 
"Magna. My name is Brandan." 
Q Did you ever say to the driver, "Hey, I thought I 
knew you from high school. Where did you go to high school?" 
Anything like that? 
A No. 
Q Were you concerned at all when you realized you 
didn!t know the driver? 
A Not really. 
Q Did you have a conversation with the driver about 
methamphetamine? 
A He had a conversation about me — or to me about it. 
He said, "I got a meth pipe. If you have any of that, you can 
load it up." I said, "I donft do that." 
Q How did that come up, just out of the blue? 
A He just said it, like they were off some binge or 
something. I don!t know, 
Q Did the driver appear to you to be under the 
influence of anything? 
A I don't know. I couldn't tell. 
Q How about the passenger? 
A No. 
Q Did you smell any alcohol in the vehicle? 
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A I smelled gasoline. 
Q Were there any empty containers, any empty beer 
bottles or anything like that? 
A I donf t know. 
Q You didn!t see any in the area of the car you were 
in? 
A I didn't see any. 
Q You said the driver didn't, never said anything to 
you; is that correct? 
A I guess he did. 
Q What would that be? 
A He asked me if I had any meth. . 
Q Anything else? Did he ask — 
A And then he said — yes, he did say — after his 
brother got out and went into the mall, he said, "I am like his 
1F!ing taxi." 
Q What about, more specifically, about the gun? Did 
the driver have any conversation with you about the gun? 
A No. 
Q Did you tell the police that the driver told you that 
he had a .25 automatic? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q And how did you find out that information? 
A I didn't know if it was a .25 automatic. I told him 
that I didn't know. Somebody said it. I don't know who did. 
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Q Somebody did, you are not sure whether it was the 
driver or the passenger? 
A Yeah. 
Q When you first got out of the car, Brandan, did both 
the driver and the passenger also exit the vehicle? 
A Yes, they did. 
Q And where were you standing when they were working — 
who was working on the back seat of the vehicle? 
A The driver. The driver was. 
Q And where were you standing in relation to the 
vehicle? 
A I was standing behind the driver's side door. 
Q Where was the driver standing? 
A He was standing — he was in front of me, trying to 
fix the seat. 
Q I am sorry, where was the passenger standing? 
A I didn!t notice, but he was standing over here. 
Q When you say "over here," you are gesturing off to 
your right? 
A OK, OK, OK, behind the car. 
Q And in front of you? 
A In back of me. Well, it was more like to the side of 
me. 
Q Off to your right? 
A Yes. 
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Q Can you describe the knife that the passenger pulled 
on you? 
A Yeah. It had a black case on it, a black holder, and 
the blade was about 3 inches long, and it was fat at the 
bottom, small at the top, and it had like a saw at the bottom 
of the blade, but not on the top. 
Q Serration? 
A Yeah. 
Q Will you describe the CD case that was taken from 
you. 
A Yes. It was a black Case Logic CD case. 
Q How many CDf s does it hold? 
A About 250. 
Q Did you provide a list to the police detailing the 
inventory of the CD's that were taken? 
A They have never asked me to. 
Q Have any of these items been recovered? 
A I donf t think so. 
Q You haven't gotten anything back? 
A No. 
Q And you also lost a player, a boom box, if you will, 
right? 
A No. Personal. 
Q A personal player? 
A Yes. 
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Q What kind of CD player was that? 
A That was a Panasonic. 
MR. QUINLAN: That's all I have. 
THE COURT: Any redirect? 
MR. NEILL: Just a couple of questions. 
* * * 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. NEILL: 
Q Brandan, a moment ago one of the defense attorneys 
asked you about a .25 automatic, that word was said. Could you 
please tell us who said it, and when someone referred to a 
specific gun? 
A Thatf s after we got out of the car, when he said, "Go 
get the gun," I thought he said .25 automatic. But I am not 
sure. I was pretty much in shock at that time. 
Q So the passenger said, "Go get the .25 automatic"? 
A Yes, the one that was holding the knife on me first. 
Q And who asked you to remove your sweater? 
A The passenger. He actually said, "Take off your 
clothes." 
Q Then you took off your — 
A Then I proceeded to take off my sweater. 
Q Were you assuming he wanted to take it or something? 
A I don't know. Just something to embarrass me is what 
I thought. 
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' Q With regard to a question Ms. Gustin asked you about, 
who took what, if you could take a moment and, to the best of 
your recollection, who took your items, the driver, passenger? 
MS. GUSTIN: Your Honor, I think that has been asked 
and answered. 
MR. NEILL: I believe there were two answers. He 
said the driver took the portable CD player. And then when 
Ms. Gustin asked, I thought he said he — I just was asking for 
some clarification. 
THE COURT: In cross examination, Ms. Gustin, he did 
say he was not sure who took the CD's. On direct examination 
he indicated the driver took the CDfs. There is some 
ambiguity. Therefore, I will allow the question. 
Q As best as you can recall, and if you need a minute 
to think about it, who took what? 
A The passenger took my CD player and my razor. And I 
heard the driver say, "I am keeping these," and took my CDf s. 
MR. NEILL: Thanks, Brandan. 
Thank you, your Honor. 
• * * 
RECROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MS. GUSTIN: 
Q I have one follow-up. You said that you just took 
off your sweater or sweatshirt. What interrupted you taking 
off the rest of your clothes? Or did you just refuse to take 
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them off? 
* A No. I think — I — I don!t remember. I don't know. 
Something happened, or they just got scared, or something like 
that, and decided to leave. 
Q Had you been drinking that day? 
A No, I hadn't. 
Q Had you used drugs? 
A No. I don't use drugs. 
MS. GUSTIN: That's all I have. 
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Quinlan? 
MR. QUINLAN: It is not exactly related to the 
redirect. It is something briefly, if I could. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. That's fine. 
• * • 
RECROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. QUINLAN: 
Q How did the conversation end when the driver asked 
you about whether you had any methamphetamine? 
A I just said, "No. I don't do that." 
Q Was that the end of the discussion? 
A Yes, it was. 
Q Was there any further talk about taking you to a 
party or anything like that? 
A No, I don't remember. 
Q Did you overhear any discussion between the driver 
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and the passenger about going to a party? 
A I donft think so. The passenger was on the phone. 
That was about it. And he said, "I live in a storage shed," to 
his buddy on the phone. 
Q Any other conversation that you can recall, that you 
haven!t talked about, yet? 
A I talked about when he went to J.C. Penneyf s, and the 
passenger said, "I am his taxi.11 
Q Anything else go on in the car, that we haven't 
discussed? 
A No. 
MR. QUINLAN: OK. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
MR. NEILL: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Booth, thank you for your appearance 
today. You are welcome to stay in the courtroom as the victim 
in this case. You have that right. 
Call your next witness. 
MR. HILLS: Your Honor, Blake Hills for the State. 
The State will be calling Detective Johnson. 
THE COURT: Mr. Johnson, come forward and be sworn. 
• * * 
FRANK JOHNSON, 
called as a witness by the State, having been duly sworn, was 
examined and testified as follows: 
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JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
1. GENERAL INSTRUCTION 
There are certain laws and rules which apply to this case. I'll explain them to you from 
time to time during these proceedings in order to give you the information that you need to 
fulfill your role as jurors at each stage of the trial. I will give you the first set of instructions 
at this point. You will receive further instructions before evidence is presented and the final 
set of instructions after the close of evidence. Please pay careful attention. Each of you has 
been given a copy of these instructions. This copy is yours to keep. As I read these 
instructions to you, you may follow along on your copy, or not, as you wish. Keep in mind 
the following points: 
Obey Instructions. Some of these instructions give you information about how the 
trial will proceed, the rules that govern this process, and the roles of the participants, 
including your role as jurors. Other instructions tell you what the law is that you are 
to apply in reaching your verdict in this case. If any attorney makes statements of the 
law that differ from the instructions on the law that I give to you, you should 
disregard such statements and rely entirely on these instructions. 
Many Instructions. There will be many instructions. All are important. Don't pick out 
one and ignore the rest. Think about each instruction in the context of all the others. 
Gender -Singular/Plural. In these instructions, any references to "she" or "her" also 
include "he" or "him," or vice versa, as appropriate to this case; and the singular, such 
as "defendant" includes the plural "defendants," when appropriate. 
Note Taking. The Bailiff will provide you with notepads and pens, if you want them. 
You may take notes during the trial, but don't over do it, and don't let it distract you 
from following the evidence. The lawyers will review the evidence in their closing 
arguments and help you focus on what is most relevant to your decision. I also 
caution that notes are not evidence. Use them only to aid personal memory or 
concentration. Keep in mind that you must each arrive at a verdict independently, and 
one juror's memory of the evidence or opinion should not be given excessive 
consideration solely because that juror has taken notes. 
Keep an Open Mind. Don't form or express an opinion about the ultimate issues in 
this case until you have listened to all the evidence and the lawyers' summaries, along 
with the final instructions on the law. Keep an open mind until then. 
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2. WHAT RULES APPLY TO RECESSES 
From time to time I will call for a recess. It may be for a few minutes, a lunch break, 
overnight or longer. During recesses, do not talk about this case with anyone; not family, 
friends or even with each other. The bailiff may ask you to wear a badge identifying yourself 
as a juror so that people will not try to discuss the case with you. Don't mingle with the 
lawyers, the parties, the witnesses or anyone else connected with the case. You may say 
"hello" or exchange similar brief civilities with these persons, in passing, but don't engage 
in any conversation. Don't accept from or give to any of these persons any favors, however 
slight, such as rides or food. The lawyers and parties are naturally concerned to avoid any 
hint of improper contact with you, so don't think that they are being purposely rude if they 
avoid any interaction with you during the course of this trial. If anyone tries to talk to you 
about the case, let the bailiff know immediately. Finally, don't read about this case in the 
newspaper or listen to any reports on television or radio, if there are any. These restraints 
are necessary for a fair trial. 
3. THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE, THE JURY AND THE LAWYERS 
The judge, the jury and the lawyers are all officers of the Court and play important 
roles in the trial. 
Judge. It is my role as judge to decide all legal issues, supervise the trial and instruct 
the jury on the LAW that it must apply. 
Jury. It is your role as the jury to follow that law and decide the factual issues. 
Factual issues generally relate to WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, HOW or similar 
things concerning which evidence will be presented.1 
Lawyers. It is the role of the lawyers to present evidence, generally by calling and 
questioning witnesses and presenting exhibits. It is the responsibility of each of the 
lawyers to be an advocate, and each has a duty to try to persuade you to accept her 
version of the facts and to decide the case in favor of her client. 
1
 In the case of alternate juror(s): An alternate juror has the same responsibilities as any other 
juror, as he may be required to take the place of one of the jurors in the panel in the event an original 
juror is unable to complete her service. Any alternate juror selected will be identified as such once 
the case has been presented and the jury is ready to retire to deliberate on a verdict. 
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Keep in mind that neither the lawyers nor I actually decide the case, because that is 
your role. Don't be influenced by what you think our personal opinions are; rather, you 
decide the case based upon the law explained in these instructions and the evidence 
presented in court. 
4. OUTLINE OF THE TRIAL 
The trial will generally proceed as follows: 
Opening Statements. The lawyers will outline what the case is about and indicate 
what they think the evidence will show. 
Presentation of Evidence. The plaintiff will offer its evidence first followed by the 
defendant. Each side may also offer rebuttal evidence after hearing the witnesses and 
seeing the exhibits offered by the other side. 
Additional instructions on the Law. After each side has presented its evidence, I will 
give you additional instructions on the law that applies to this case. 
Closing Arguments. The lawyers will then summarize and argue the case. They will 
share with you their respective views of the evidence, how it relates to the law and 
how they think you should decide the case. 
Jury Deliberation. The final step is for you to retire to the jury room and deliberate 
until you reach a verdict, and you will be given additional instructions about how you 
are to do that later. 
5. THE CHARGE(S) and THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE 
The defendant in this case has been accused of committing a crime. The accusation 
is in a written document called an INFORMATION, which will be read or summarized for 
you following this instruction. As you listen, keep in mind that the defendant has answered 
the charge by saying "not guilty." The defendant is presumed to be innocent of the charge. 
[THE INFORMATION IS READ OR SUMMARIZED FOR THE JURY] 
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AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, at 3695 West 2340 South, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
on or about March 12, 2003, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 302, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the Defendant Robert Kelton Berry, as a party to the 
offense, intentionally or knowingly used force or fear of immediate force against Phillip B 
Booth in the course of committing a theft, used or threatened the use of a dangerous weapon, 
to-wit: Firearm and/or a knife. Further that a dangerous weapon or a facsimile of a 
dangerous weapon or the representation of a dangerous weapon was used in the commission 
or furtherance of the Aggravated Robbery. 
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6. WHAT IS THE JURY'S ROLE IN THIS CASE? 
You must decide whether each charge against the defendant has been proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt. Your decision is called a VERDICT. Your verdict must be based only 
on the evidence produced here in court. It must be based on facts, not on speculation. Don't 
guess about any fact. However, you may draw reasonable inferences or arrive at reasonable 
conclusions from the evidence presented. 
7. WHAT IS EVIDENCE? 
Evidence is anything that tends to prove or disprove the existence of a disputed fact. 
It can be testimony, or documents, or objects, or photographs, or stipulations, or certain 
qualified opinions, or any combination of these things. Sometimes the lawyers may agree 
that certain facts exist; this is called a stipulation. You should accept any stipulated facts as 
having been proved. In limited instances, I may take "judicial notice" of a well-known fact. 
If that happens, I will explain how you should treat it. 
8. OPINION TESTIMONY 
Under certain circumstances, witnesses are allowed to express an opinion. A person 
who by education, study or experience has become an expert in any art, science or 
profession, may give her opinion and the reason for it. A layperson (a non-expert) is also 
allowed to express an opinion if it is based on personal observations and it is helpful to 
understanding his testimony or the case. You are not bound to believe anyone's opinion. 
Consider it as you would any other evidence, and give it the weight you think it deserves. 
9. WHAT IS NOT TO BE CONSIDERED OR USED AS EVIDENCE? 
I've explained to you what evidence is. Now I'll tell you about some things which do 
not qualify as evidence or which, for some other good reason, you should not consider in 
reaching your verdict. 
Accusation. The fact that formal charges have been filed accusing the defendant of 
committing a crime is not evidence of guilt. The defendant has entered a plea of not 
guilty and is presumed to be innocent. As I will discuss in more detail later in these 
instructions, it is the prosecution's burden to prove to you that the defendant is guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt; the defendant does not have the burden to prove that he 
or she is innocent. 
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Punishment. You may be aware of the gravity of the offense charged and the range 
of potential penalties, but you should not consider what actual punishment the 
defendant may receive if found guilty. That is for the judge to decide based upon the 
applicable law. 
Right to Remain Silent. If the defendant chooses not to testify in this case, you cannot 
consider that as evidence of guilt. The Constitution provides that an accused person 
has the right not to testify and you should not draw any negative inferences based 
upon a defendant's reliance on this right. If the defendant does choose to testify, his 
or her testimony should be given the same consideration you would give to the 
testimony of any other witness. The fact that a person is accused of a crime is no 
evidence of that person's guilt and is no reason for rejecting his or her testimony; it 
should be weighed the same way you weigh the testimony of any other witness. 
Lawyer Statements. What the lawyers say is not evidence. Their purpose is to give 
you a preview of expected evidence and to help you understand the evidence from 
their viewpoint. If a lawyer makes a statement about the evidence which is different 
from your own recollection of the evidence, you should rely on your own memory. 
Personal Investigation. Evidence is not what you can find out on your own. You 
should not make any investigation about the facts in this case. Do not make personal 
inspections, observations or experiments. Do not view premises, things or articles not 
produced in court. Don't let anyone else do anything like this for you. Don't look for 
information in law books, dictionaries or public or private records which are not 
produced in court. 
Out of Court Information. Do not consider anything you may have heard or read 
about this case in the media or by word of mouth or other out-of-court 
communication. You must rely solely on the evidence that is produced and received 
in court. 
10. THE JUDGE DECIDES WHAT EVIDENCE IS ADMISSIBLE 
Sometimes a question will be raised about whether certain evidence is proper for the 
jury to consider. This type of question is called an OBJECTION. I rule on objections. If an 
objection is SUSTAINED the evidence is kept out and you should not consider it, nor should 
you guess as to what the evidence might have been or as to the reason for the objection. If 
an objection is OVERRULED the evidence comes in and you may consider it. If evidence 
which you have heard or seen is STRICKEN you must ignore it. 
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My decisions regarding the admission of evidence involve issues of law, and I am not 
giving any opinion as to which witnesses are or are not worthy of belief or as to which party 
should prevail in the case. Don't be concerned about the reasons for my rulings, and don't 
try to infer anything about the case from those rulings. 
Further, if I do or say anything during the course of this trial that suggests to you that 
I favor the position of either party, whether in my rulings or otherwise, it is entirely 
unintentional; and you must not be influenced by that in any way. 
[OPENING STATEMENTS BY COUNSEL] 
11. HOW TO MAKE DECISIONS ABOUT THE EVIDENCE 
It will be your duty to determine your verdict relying solely on the evidence presented 
during the trial. For that purpose you should consider all of the evidence together, fairly, 
impartially and conscientiously, putting aside any bias, prejudice, or preconceptions. 
Once evidence is admitted, you must decide three things about it: Whether it should 
be believed, how important it is, and what you can infer or conclude from it. 
Use your common sense as a reasonable person in making these decisions. Review 
all the evidence. Don't imagine things which have no evidence to back them up. Consider the 
evidence fairly without any bias or sympathy toward either side. 
Where there is conflicting evidence, you should try to reconcile the conflict so far as 
you reasonably can. Where the conflict cannot be reconciled, you are the final judges and 
must determine from the evidence what the facts are. 
12. DECIDING WHETHER TO BELIEVE A WITNESS 
You are the sole judges of the importance of the evidence, the believability of the 
witnesses and the facts. There is no firm rule that I can give you for determining whether 
a witness is truthful. As each witness testifies, you must decide how accurate that testimony 
is and what weight to give it, using your own good judgment and experience in life. In 
evaluating testimony, it may help you to ask yourself questions such as these: 
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Personal Interest. Does the witness have a personal interest in how the trial comes 
out? 
Other Bias. Does the witness have some other bias or motive to testify a certain way? 
Demeanor. What impression is made by the witness's appearance and conduct while 
answering questions? 
Consistency. Did the witness make conflicting statements or contradict other 
evidence? 
Knowledge and Memory. Did the witness have a good opportunity to know the facts 
and the ability to remember them? 
Reasonableness. Is the testimony reasonable in light of human experience? 
You may also apply any other common sense yardstick to the testimony you hear and 
the other evidence you receive. You are not required to believe any witness or all that a 
witness says. You are entitled to believe one witness as against many or many as against 
one, in accordance with your honest convictions. The mere fact that a witness is a police 
officer, in itself, does not make that person's testimony more or less credible, but such 
testimony must be weighed in the same way as you would any other witness. 
13. WHAT IF A WITNESS PURPOSELY GIVES FALSE TESTIMONY? 
If you believe a witness has purposely given false testimony about anything relevant 
to the case, you may disregard not only the false testimony but any of the remaining 
testimony from that witness, or you may give the remaining testimony whatever weight you 
think it deserves. 
14. WHO IS RESPONSIBLE TO CONVINCE THE JURY? 
The prosecution has the burden of proof. It is the one making the accusations in this 
case. The defendant is not required to prove innocence - you must start by assuming it. 
According to our law, the defendant is presumed to be innocent unless proven guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt. This is an important and humane provision of the law intended to guard 
against the danger of an innocent person being unjustly punished. 
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15. HOW CONVINCED MUST THE JURY BE BEFORE DECIDING THE 
DEFENDANT IS GUILTY? 
Before you can give up your assumption that the defendant is innocent, you must be 
convinced that the defendant's guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of proof which satisfies the mind and convinces the 
understanding of reasonable persons who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. 
16. WHAT IS A REASONABLE DOUBT? 
A reasonable doubt is one based upon reason and common sense rather than 
speculation, supposition, emotion or sympathy. It is the kind of doubt that would make a 
reasonable person hesitate to act. It must be real and not merely imaginary. It is such as 
would be retained by reasonable men and women after a full and impartial consideration of 
all the evidence, and must arise from the evidence or lack of evidence in the case. 
17. HOW TO EVALUATE DOUBT 
If after such full and impartial consideration some possible doubt exists, you must 
determine whether such doubt is reasonable in light of all the evidence. Ask yourselves if 
the doubt is consistent with reason and common sense. The law does not require that the 
evidence dispel all possible or conceivable doubt, but rather the law requires that the 
evidence dispel all reasonable doubt. That is what is meant by the phrase "proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt." 
[THE EVIDENCE IS PRESENTED AT THIS POINT] 
[AFTER THE CLOSE OFEVIDENCE\ THE CLERK ADDS TO EACH COPY 
ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE] 
18. INSTRUCTIONS ON THE LAW THAT APPLIES TO THIS CASE 
The clerk has attached to your copy of these instructions some additional pages which 
contain instructions relating to the particular laws or rules that apply to this case. These 
additional instructions begin with instruction number twenty-seven (27). We will read those 
after completing our review of the following instructions which relate essentially to the 
procedure that you should follow when you are released to deliberate. 
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19. WHAT TO TAKE WITH YOU INTO THE JURY ROOM 
You may take the following things with you when you go into the jury room to 
discuss this case: 
a. All exhibits admitted in evidence; 
b. Your notes (if any); 
c. Your copy of these instructions; and 
d. The verdict form or forms that will be given to you. 
20. WHAT TO DO IN THE JURY ROOM 
The first thing you should do in the jury room is choose a person to be in charge. This 
person is called the FOREPERSON. The Foreperson's duties are: 
a. To keep order and allow everyone a chance to speak; 
b. To represent the jury in any communications you make; and 
c. To sign your verdict and bring it back to court. 
In deciding what the verdict should be, all jurors are equal. The Foreperson has no 
more power than any other juror. 
21. CONSIDER EACH OTHERS OPINION, THEN REACH YOUR OWN 
DECISION BASED UPON HONEST DELIBERATION 
It is rarely productive or good for a juror, upon entering the jury room, to make an 
emphatic expression of opinion or to announce a determination to stand for a certain verdict. 
When that is done at the outset, a person's sense of pride may block appropriate 
consideration of the case. Use your common memory, your common understanding and your 
common sense. Talk about the case with each other as you ponder and deliberate. 
In the end, your verdict must be your own. Don't make a decision just to agree with 
everyone else. You should, however, respect and consider the opinions of the other jurors. 
If you are persuaded that a decision you initially made was wrong, don't hesitate to change 
your mind. Help each other arrive at the truth. Your decision must be unanimous. In an 
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attempt to reach a decision, you may not resort to chance or any form of decision-making 
other than honest deliberation. 
22. WHAT TO DO IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS DURING DELIBERATION 
If you think you need more information or a clarification, write a note and give it to 
the bailiff I will review it with the lawyers. We will answer your question whenever 
appropriate. However, these instructions should contain all the information you need to 
reach a verdict based upon the evidence that has been presented to you. 
23. FOCUS ON THIS CASE ALONE 
Your duty is to decide this case and this case alone. You should not use this case as 
a forum for correcting perceived wrongs in other cases or in the broader society, or as a 
means of expressing views about anything other than the guilt or innocence of this defendant. 
Your verdict should reflect the law given to you in these instructions applied to the facts that 
you find to be supported by the evidence. Your decision should not be distorted by any 
outside factors or objectives. 
The final test of the quality of your service will be the verdict you return. You will 
make an important contribution to justice and your community if you focus exclusively on 
this case and return a just and proper verdict. 
24. REACHING A VERDICT 
This being a criminal case, your verdict must be unanimous; all jurors must agree. 
When you are all in agreement, then you have reached a verdict and your work is finished. 
25. HOW TO REPORT YOUR VERDICT 
When you have reached a verdict, the Foreperson should date and sign the verdict 
form which corresponds to your decision. Then notify the bailiff that you are ready to return 
to court. 
26. WHAT HAPPENS AFTER THE VERDICT HAS BEEN REPORTED 
After you have given your verdict to the judge, he or the clerk may ask each of you 
about it to make sure you agree with it. Then you will be released from your jury service and 
you may leave at any time. If you want to, you may remain in the courtroom to watch the 
rest of the proceedings, which should be quite brief. 
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After you are excused, you may talk about the case with anyone. Likewise, you are 
not required to talk about it, if you don't want to. If anyone attempts to talk to you about the 
case when you don't want to do that, please tell the Court Clerk. Finally, if you do decide 
to discuss the case with anyone, keep in mind that your fellow jurors freely stated their 
opinions in the jury room with the understanding that they were speaking in confidence. 
Please respect the privacy of the views of your fellow jurors. 
[FINAL ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS ADDED AFTER THIS PAGE] 
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INSTRUCTION NO. J^*~ 
The intent with which an act is done shows a state of mind and reveals a purpose in so 
acting. Intent, being a state of mind, is seldom shown by proof of direct and positive evidence 
and is ordinarily inferred from acts, conduct, statements and circumstances. 
000190 
. - & INSTRUCTION NO 
Intent and motive should never be confused. Motive is what prompts a person to act, or 
fail to act. Intent refers only to the state of mind with which an act is done or omitted. 
Motive is not an element of any offense, and hence need not be proven. The motive of an 
accused is immaterial except insofar as evidence of motive may aid in your determination of 
state of mind or intent. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
To constitute the crime charged in the information there must be the joint operation of 
two essential elements: conduct prohibited by law and the appropriate culpable mental state or 
states with regard to the conduct prohibited by law. 
Before a defendant may be found guilty of a crime, the evidence must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant was prohibited by law from committing the conduct charged 
in the information and that the defendant committed such conduct with the culpable mental state 
required for such offense. 
"Conduct" means an act or omission. 
"Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and/or speech. 
"Omission" means a failure to act when there is a legal duty to act and the actor is 
capable of acting. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. «**-^ 
A person engages in conduct intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the 
nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to 
engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
A person engages in conduct knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct 
or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the 
existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of 
his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 3 ( 
Although there is more than one person who is named in this action, the case against each 
person is separate from and independent of the case of the other. In this action the only 
defendant on trial is Robert K. Berry. You are not to concern yourselves with the status of the 
case against the other defendant named in this trial. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of the offense 
who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally 
aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable 
as a party for such conduct. 
000195 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
"Dangerous weapon" means any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury, 
or a facsimile or representation of the item, and: 
(a) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads the victim 
to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury; or 
(b) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other manner 
that the actor is in control of such an item. 
000196 
INSTRUCTION NO. ! & ~ 
You are instructed that a firearm is a dangerous weapon. 
000197 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3*5" 
You are instructed that a knife is a dangerous weapon. 
00019S 
3£ INSTRUCTION NO 
"Unlawful" means that which is contrary to law or unauthorized by law, or, without legal 
justification, or, illegal. 
"Personal property" mean anything of value, and includes money. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. :> T 
Before you can convict the defendant, Robert K. Berry, of the offense of Aggravated 
Robbery as charged in the Information, you must first find that the defendant committed Robbery. 
Before you can find that the defendant committed Robbery, you must find from all of the evidence 
and beyond a reasonable doubt each one of the following elements of that offense: 
1. That on or about the 12th day of march, 2003, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
defendant, Robert K. Berry, himself or as a party to such conduct, took personal property in the 
possession of Brandon Booth from the person or immediate presence of Brandon Booth; and 
2. That such taking was unlawful; and 
3. That such taking was intentional; and 
4. That such taking was against the will of Brandon Booth; and 
5. That such taking was accomplished by means of force or fear. 
If you find each and every one of the preceding elements, you must then consider whether 
the defendant committed Aggravated Robbery. Before you can find that defendant committed 
Aggravated Robbery, you must find from all of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt: 
6. That, in the course of committing robbery, the defendant, himself or as a party to such 
conduct, used or threatened to use a dangerous weapon. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the truth 
of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the 
defendant guilty of Aggravated Robbery, as charged in the Information. If you are not convinced 
of the truth of any one or more of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must 
find the defendant not guilty of Aggravated Robbery, as charged in the Information. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The law permits a jury to find a defendant guilty of any lesser offense which is 
necessarily included in the crime charged in the Information whenever such a course is consistent 
with the facts found by the jury from the evidence in the case and with the law as stated by the 
court. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. -> ( 
If you do not find the defendant, Robert K. Berry, guilty of the offense of Aggravated 
Robbery, as charged in the information, you should consider whether the defendant is guilty of 
Robbery, a lesser included offense of Aggravated Robbery. 
Before you can convict the defendant, Robert K. Berry, of the offense of Robbery as charged 
in the Information, you must find from all of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt each one 
of the following elements of that offense: 
1. That on or about the 12th day of march, 2003, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
defendant, Robert K. Berry, himself or as a party to such conduct, took personal property in the 
possession of Brandon Booth from the person or immediate presence of Brandon Booth; and 
2. That such taking was unlawful; and 
3. That such taking was intentional; and 
4. That such taking was against the will of Brandon Booth; and 
5. That such taking was done by means of force or fear. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the truth 
of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the 
defendant guilty of Robbery. If you are not convinced of the truth of any one or more of the 
foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant not guilty of 
Robbery. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
An act shall be considered to be "in the course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an 
attempt to commit, during the commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or 
commission of such a taking. 
000203 
INSTRUCTION NO. T~f 
If you find the defendant guilty of Aggravated Robbery, you must decide from all the 
evidence whether the following occurred: 
A dangerous weapon was used by the defendant, himself or as a party 
to such conduct, in the commission or furtherance of the Aggravated 
Robbery. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the truth of the 
foregoing statement beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find that a dangerous weapon was 
used as stated above. If you are not convinced of the truth of the foregoing statement beyond a 
reasonable doubt, then you must find that a dangerous weapon was not used as stated above. 
000204 
1^ 2_ INSTRUCTION NO. 
Your verdict in this case must be either: 
GUILTY of Aggravated Robbery, as charged in the Information, 
or 
NOT GUILTY of Aggravated Robbery, as charged in the information; 
and 
GUILTY of Robbery, a lesser included offense of Aggravated Robbery, 
or 
NOT GUILTY of Robbery, a lesser included offense of Aggravated Robbery. 
YOU MAY NOT FIND THE DEFENDANT GUILTY OF BOTH AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 
AND ROBBERY. 
IF YOU FIND THE DEFENDANT GUILTY OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, then you 
must decide the following: 
A dangerous weapon WAS USED by the defendant, himself or as a party to such 
conduct, in the commission or furtherance of the Aggravated Robbery 
or 
A dangerous weapon WAS NOT USED by the defendant, himself or as a party to such 
conduct, in the commission or furtherance of the Aggravated Robbery 
As I have instructed you before, because this is a criminal case, your verdict must be 
unanimous. 
DATED this /(j ^day of December, 2003. 
BY THE COURT: 
Stephen L. Roth * 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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Q Again, if I am you, where did he hold this knife to 
your neck? 
A Like right here. 
Q Thank you. You may be seated. 
Brandan, when the defendant's younger brother hit 
you, did he say anything at that point? 
A Not when he hit me; : ut after he hit me, he said, 
"What do you have? Give me all your stuff." 
Q Was that before he pulled out the knife, or after? 
A That was after. 
Q What did the knife look like? 
A Black handle, silver blade, a couple inches belong. 
MR. NEILL: Your Honor, may I approach the witness? 
THE COURT: You may. 
Q (By Mr. Neill) Brandan, I am showing you a knife, not 
the knife used in this case, but is this a knife similar to 
what the defendant!s brother had? 
A Yes, it is. 
Q It was a flip blade? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q Are there any differences between the knife you are 
holding now and the knife that was pulled on you? 
A I am not sure. It looks about the same. 
Q You mentioned that he held that to your throat? 
A Yeah. 
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Q What were you thinking at this point? 
A My life is over. I don't know. 
Q Did you feel threatened? 
A Yeah, I did. 
Q What did you do? 
A Gave him all my stuff. 
Q What stuff was that? 
A CD's, my radio, my wallet, everything I had. 
Q You gave those items to the defendant's younger 
brother? 
A No, not all of them. I gave my CD's and my wallet to 
him. 
Q Your CD's? 
A No, my CD player and my wallet. And then I don't 
remember where my CD's were. I think they were in the car. 
Q What did the defendant's brother do with your wallet? 
A Looked through it, took the money out, threw it back 
at me at some point. 
Q While the defendant's brother had the knife to your 
throat, while he took this stuff, do you recall what the 
defendant was doing? 
A I think he was reaching under his seat. I am not 
sure. It was a long time ago, and I don't remember every 
little thing. 
Q Did the defendant ever take possession of any of your 
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items? 
A He took my CD's. 
Q Please tell the jury about that. 
A I don't remember where they were or anything, but 
the — his brother wanted to give them back to me, and then he 
looked through them. 
Q Who is "he"? 
A The defendant looked through them. And he said, "I 
am keeping these." 
Q And did he keep them? 
A Yeah. 
Q How many CDf s did you have in there? 
A About 200. 
Q And did you buy all those CD's, yourself? 
A Yeah, I did. 
Q What did the defendant do with the CD's, the CD case? 
A I donft know. 
Q Brandan, at that point what happened? 
A They tried to make me take my clothes off. And then 
they made me get in the corner. They didn't — 
MS. GUSTIN-FURGIS: Your Honor, I am going to object. 
He is saying "they." I would like to know specifically who did 
what. 
THE COURT: Sustained. You are going to need to lay 
a little more foundation as to who said what. 
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what's going on. He wouldn't have wasted his time to fix the 
seat. There would be no reason to do it. 
Now, the State is trying to suggest that the — the 
victim is trying to suggest that the victim was taken on a wild 
goose chase here. And that just is not true. Again, he was in 
the car for a long period of time. And if you are going up to 
Bangerter to go out to Magna, you can cut through there. They 
went to the McDonald's which is on 36th West. You go north 
there. You run into the residential areas. And there are 
several streets that head up to Bangerter. The only reason 
they pulled over in that area was, number one, first, Karl had 
to throw up, if you remember that. He got sick and he got out. 
He threw up. Then they get back in. Then they have to adjust 
the seat, because the guy was uncomfortable. He mentions that. 
He says that his feet were scrunched up and it was very 
uncomfortable. And that is why they pulled over, not to pull 
over into some secluded area to rob him. 
Now, ladies and gentlemen, I told you in opening that 
I would talk about beyond a reasonable doubt. And that's a 
very, very high standard in our justice system. It is the 
highest standard of proof that there is. And there are several 
standards of proof. One is by the preponderance of the 
evidence. And that's in a civil case. And the jury can find 
for, say, like a plaintiff, if they have shown by the 
preponderance of the evidence whatever they are trying to 
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prove. 
A higher standard is clear and convincing evidence. 
That's even a higher standard. 
And, ladies and gentlemen, if you find that the State 
has proven this case by a preponderance of the evidence, or if 
you find that the State has proven its case by clear and 
convincing evidence, your verdict must be not guilty, because 
that is not high enough. Beyond a reasonable doubt is higher 
than that. If you think that he maybe committed an aggravated 
robbery or a robbery, your verdict must be not guilty. If you 
think that he probably committed a robbery or an aggravated 
robbery, your verdict must still be not guilty. That is how 
high the standard of proof is in this case. 
And I have talked about how serious these offenses 
are, and how important this decision is that you are making 
today. It is as important, if not more important, than 
deciding who you are going to marry or if you are going to buy 
a house. That's how careful you have to be and what factors 
you would weigh in saying, "Am I going to marry this person?" 
And the thing is, in a case like that, with buying a house or 
marrying somebody, you can change that decision. You can get a 
divorce. You can sell your house. But in this case you 
cannot. 
And, ladies and gentlemen, I was going over the 
transcript last night, and I just gave up counting how many 
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times the victim said, "I don't know. Ifm not sure. I donft 
know. Ifm not sure." That is not beyond a reasonable doubt. 
He is not sure what happened, so how can you be sure? How can 
they ask you to convict him? They have not proven their case 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and I ask for two not guilty 
verdicts. 
Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Gustin-Furgis. 
Ms. Peters? 
MS. PETERS: Thank you, your Honor. The defendant 
did the best he could. So then he drove Brandan to safety. He 
was the driver. His brother wanted to jack him. He got a text 
message and then he said, "Don't do it." So, of course, the 
next step would be to drive Brandan to safety, because he 
didn't want it to happen, so he drove Brandan to a bus stop. 
No, we didn't hear anything about that. He drove Brandan to a 
police station, so he wouldn't get jacked. We didn't hear 
anything about that, either. Did he drive Brandan home? No. 
Instead, he drove Brandan to a secluded area. When you go back 
and deliberate, look at the map. See how many houses you see 
on the map. See how many warehouses you see. There is nothing 
back there but warehouses. And you heard testimony from John 
Maez, who has been a security guard with USANA for six years, 
that there is nothing over there except warehouses. I don't 
think that that is a protective area. I don't think the 
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Addendum F 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(g) outlines the different stages of a criminal 
jury trial: 
(g) After the jury has been impaneled and sworn, the trial shall 
proceed in the following order: 
(1) The charge shall be read and the plea of the defendant stated; 
(2) The prosecuting attorney may make an opening statement 
and the defense may make an opening statement or reserve it 
until the prosecution has rested; 
(3) The prosecution shall offer evidence in support of the charge; 
(4) When the prosecution has rested, the defense may present its 
case; 
(5) Thereafter, the parties may offer only rebutting evidence 
unless the court, for good cause, otherwise permits; 
(6) When the evidence is concluded and at any other 
appropriate time, the court shall instruct the jury; and. 
(7) Unless the cause is submitted to the jury on either side or on 
both sides without argument, the prosecution shall open the 
argument, the defense shall follow and the prosecution may 
close by responding to the defense argument. The court may set 
reasonable limits upon the argument of counsel for each party 
and the time to be allowed for argument. 
Addendum G 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 19 details the procedures for instructing jurors: 
Rule 19. Instructions. 
(a) After the jury is sworn and before opening statements, the 
court may instruct the jury concerning the jurors' duties and 
conduct, the order of proceedings, the elements and burden of 
proof for the alleged crime, and the definition of terms. The 
court may instruct the jury concerning any matter stipulated to 
by the parties and agreed to by the court and any matter the 
court in its discretion believes will assist the jurors in 
comprehending the case. Preliminary instructions shall be in 
writing and a copy provided to each juror. At the final pretrial 
conference or at such other time as the court directs, a party may 
file a written request that the court instruct the jury on the law 
as set forth in the request. The court shall inform the parties of 
its action upon a requested instruction prior to instructing the 
jury, and it shall furnish the parties with a copy of its proposed 
instructions, unless the parties waive this requirement. 
(b) During the course of the trial, the court may instruct the jury 
on the law if the instruction will assist the jurors in 
comprehending the case. Prior to giving the written instruction, 
the court shall advise the parties of its intent to do so and of the 
content of the instruction. A party may request an interim 
written instruction. 
(c) At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the 
court reasonably directs, any party may file written request that 
the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in the request. 
At the same time copies of such requests shall be furnished to 
the other parties. The court shall inform counsel of its proposed 
action upon the request; and it shall furnish counsel with a copy 
of its proposed instructions, unless the parties waive this 
requirement. Final instructions shall be in writing and at least 
one copy provided to the jury. The court shall provide a copy to 
any juror who requests one and may, in its discretion, provide 
a copy to all jurors. 
(d) Upon each written request so presented and given, or 
refused, the court shall endorse its decision and shall initial or 
sign it. If part be given and part refused, the court shall 
distinguish, showing by the endorsement what part of the 
charge was given and what part was refused. 
(e) Objections to written instructions shall be made before the 
instructions are given to the jury. Objections to oral instructions 
may be made after they are given to the jury, but before the jury 
retires to consider its verdict. The court shall provide an 
opportunity to make objections outside the hearing of the jury. 
Unless a party objects to an instruction or the failure to give an 
instruction, the instruction may not be assigned as error except 
to avoid a manifest injustice. In stating the objection the party 
shall identify the matter to which the objection is made and the 
ground of the objection. 
(f) The court shall not comment on the evidence in the case, and 
if the court refers to any of the evidence, it shall instruct the jury 
that they are the exclusive judges of all questions of fact. 
(g) Arguments of the respective parties shall be made after the 
court has given the jury its final instructions. Unless otherwise 
provided by law, any limitation upon time for argument shall be 
within the discretion of the court. 
Addendum H 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees criminal 
defendants due process of law: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or 
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land 
or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time 
of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the 
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public 
use, without just compensation. 
Addendum I 
Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides all persons the right to due 
process of law: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law." 
